TRAINING AND EDUCATION
The Trials of a Forward Support
Company at the JRTC
One forward support company learned the hard way how important training and planning are to
providing support for a field artillery regiment.
Capt. Vanessa L. Hooperyan and Master Sgt. Neil M. Lamont
By
D
uring a recent rotation at
the Joint Readiness Training Center ( JRTC) at Fort
Polk, Louisiana, a forward support
company (FSC) supported the 1st
Battalion, 319th Airborne Field
Artillery Regiment (1–319 AFAR),
3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd
Airborne Division, solely through
reactive logistics and emergency
resupply. The company’s inability to
provide proactive sustainment to its
firing batteries was caused by several breakdowns within the system.
The 1–319th AFAR received support for all of its fire missions; however, the costs of the FSC being
completely reactive for the 14-day
training exercise were significant.
These costs included Soldiers having minimal sleep between tactical
convoys, the wrong supplies being
delivered to firing bases, and the distribution platoon having to execute
back-to-back convoys because of an
inaccurate logistics common operational picture.
Tactical Convoy Operations
A tactical convoy is a deliberately
planned combat operation to move
personnel or cargo using ground
transportation in a secure manner
under the control of a single commander. Tactical convoys must have
access to the current common operational picture and maintain an
aggressive posture that is both agile
and unpredictable.
Despite their danger, tactical
convoy operations (TCOs) are necessary to get personnel and supplies
46 Army Sustainment
from point A to point B on the battlefield. A distribution platoon with
a solid battle rhythm and higher
headquarters planning support can
provide its own security and ensure
that the correct equipment and personnel are delivered with minimal
incidents. The FSC executed 17 inefficient resupply TCOs and sometimes delivered no supplies at all.
The failures of these convoys occurred at various friction points in
the brigade, battalion, and company
logistics operations. These friction
points were caused by the inability
to come to a consensus on the firing
battery’s support requirements and
what capabilities the FSC needed.
TCO Execution
Proper planning at the company
and platoon levels plays a significant role in the success or failure of
a TCO. According to Army Doctrine Publication 4–0, Sustainment,
“through responsive sustainment,
commanders maintain operational
focus and pressure, set the tempo of
friendly operations to prevent exhaustion, replace ineffective units,
and extend operational reach.”
The first TCO that the FSC executed put them on the road at
night for more than 8 hours, and
planning for the mission was nonexistent. Additionally, the convoy
commander did not have any grid
coordinates for the supported unit
locations and only knew of general
vicinities he had seen them occupy
during the day. The convoy commander and assistant convoy com-
mander split up their TCO twice.
The first split was to get a wrecker because several trucks got stuck
en route to the first firing base. In
this first split, 360-degree security
was never established, 0–5–25–200
meter scan checks for improvised
explosive devices were not conducted, and the recovery crew had never
conducted rehearsals or an actual
TCO with their own distribution
platoon.
The second split was to find the
brigade support battalion and pick
up a class V (ammunition) load to
deliver to A Battery. During the
second split, the assistant convoy
commander had no clear picture of
the route and locations of the brigade support battalion or the firing
batteries, and the TCO had to reorient itself three times to reunite
with the convoy proper.
Before departing for this mission,
troop leading procedures were not
executed to standard. Rehearsals
were not conducted, pr X