Also setting OBOR apart is its
scale and scope. Connecting China and
its border regions to all the different
Asia’s (Southeast, Northeast, Central,
South and West), the Baltics and
Mediterranean, Eastern Africa,
and the ‘developed European
circle’, Belt and Road may
be less ‘regional’ than
i t i s ‘ i n t e r- re g i o n a l ’ a n d
‘pan-continental’.
This becomes additionally
apparent when considering
the many, tailored-to-region
and tailored-to-state initiatives
that constitute ‘Belt and Road’.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASEAN
CENTRALITY
In short, TPP and OBOR offer some
distinct cooperative frameworks.
While both aim to expand and
intensify connectivity among their
participating states, they nevertheless
differ in their organising principles and
modes of connectivity. As a singular
homogenising framework, the TPP
connects different economies around
common rules, common regulatory
approaches and common market
access, reflective of market values.
OBOR, in contrast, is a multicomponent framework that connects
diverse parts, piece-by-piece, via
their common interest in national
development. It pursues connectivity
not through common economic rules
and market liberalisation, but instead
through new infrastructure, trade and
investment facilitation zones, and
targeted development projects.
TPP and OBOR differ not just
from one another but also from
ASEAN. For one, both transcend the
normative-geographic regions that
have previously provided the basis
for regionalism and helped justify
ASEAN centrality. More critically,
both differently re-order Asia in ways
that make ASEAN and its concerns
less central.
In the case of TPP, it is open to
all in theory but exclusive in practice.
TPP also sidesteps ASEAN’s interest
in bridging developmental gaps. As
for OBOR, the bilateralism that has
typified China’s approach lends to
China’s structural advantage to set
the terms.
Turning Vision into Reality
for a Dynamic ASEAN Community
LAOS 2016
At the same time, both initiatives
face different challenges. It is worth
underscoring that both TPP and OBOR
do not yet exist. The TPP is especially
dependent on US ratification, but it is
a US election year – a time when trade
agreements can be as unpopular
as China. The realisation of the TPP
will depend on the outcome of the
presidential election as well as the
make-up of the US Congress after
the November elections.
Meanwhile, China faces
challenges of implementation
at both the Chinese and
recipient ends of the equation.
Achieving OBOR depends on
the kinds of resources China
is willing to commit, its ability
to coordinate and discipline
its own domestic agents, and
perhaps – most of all – how
sensitive China is to not just local
needs but also local sensitivities.
In both cases, ASEAN as an
institution, still has a role to play.
Collectively, ASEAN remains an
important audience for both initiatives.
Maritime Southeast Asia may also be
especially important to the realisation
of China’s Maritime Silk Road.
Critically, ASEAN states can expand
their efforts to direct Washington’s
and Beijing’s engagement so that
they serve and strengthen ASEAN’s
own, particular regional integration
agendas, as well as security and
economic interests.
Alice is the Associate Professor at the University of Delaware, Newark, DE, and a
January 2016 Visiting Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore under the US State Department Fulbright
Specialist Programme. Nanyang Technological University. Her views first appeared in
Issue 108 (11 May 2016) of the RSIS Commentary.
ISSUE 2 : 2016 | ASEAN COMMUNITY OF ENTREPRENEURS
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