American politics and declared their readiness to talk with the United States, but at the same
time rejected the option of bilateral talks with Kabul. They also identified the key topic of future
negotiations with Washington, which should be the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from
Afghanistan, and it is here that the main intrigue of the negotiation process is born 24 .
The problem is that the US has several military bases in the country, which serve as a kind
of support for the American geopolitical presence and influence in the region of South Asia and
the Middle East. Therefore, meeting the Taliban’s demand for closure seems completely
unacceptable for Washington, which in turn the Taliban leadership cannot but understand. Then
the question arises: “What, in reality, is behind such a demand of the Taliban? Does it represent
an invitation to bargain or is it, nevertheless, really a strong desire to see a future Afghanistan
without foreign bases?”
If this is an invitation to bargain, then what are the potential points of intersection and
divergence of interests of the parties? The United States and Kabul will certainly be interested
in maintaining the American military presence. For Washington, this is a question of geopolitical
influence, and for the official Afghan authorities it is a guarantee of their security. Both players
are also interested in the recognition by the Taliban of the current constitution, the well-
established political and administrative system of the country, electoral and judicial systems,
which combine elements of traditional Islamic law and European legal systems. The ideal model
for the United States and Kabul would be to embed the Taliban in existing institutions and
branches of government.
Theoretically, the Taliban leadership could accept these conditions, however, it is more
likely that it will face a number of risks for itself that will come from hardliners insisting on the
rebirth of the Islamic state system that underlay the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-
2001). The split of the movement and the departure of a significant part of the “ideological”
commanders to ISIL can be quite likely the result of the manifested disagreements. The so-called
“Islamic state” has already been a challenge for the Taliban for several years, because on the
one hand it took part of the military resources from the Taliban, and on the other hand, following
a tough ideological and military course, forced the Taliban to noticeably tighten ideological
rhetoric and intensify military action to maintain its influence. The Taliban are forced to
constantly look at ISIS, since they no longer have the same monopoly to oppose official Kabul
and the Western contingents.
Thus, in order for the Taliban to decide on integration into the existing system of power in
Afghanistan, its conditionally “moderate wing” will need to be somehow convincing the “radical
wing” to integrate into the system created by the United States and Kabul. How to do this without
conflict is unclear. The ideal option would be the complete liquidation of the ISIS presence in
Afghanistan, which would prevent radicals in the Taliban from joining this terrorist group and
taking advantage of its military and financial capabilities. In August 2018, the Taliban were able
to crush the ISIL bridgehead in the northern province of Jowzjan, however, the eastern province
of Nangarhar is still a stronghold of the so-called "Islamic state".
If the Taliban really want to see Afghanistan without foreign military contingents and bases,
then the negotiations may constitute nothing more than a tactical ploy in the framework of a
more subtle multi-way game to further enhance and legalize the status of the movement as a
full party in Afghan and international affairs, as well as to expand their zones of control in the
country. On this occasion, Omar Samad, the chief adviser of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, in his article
“Can peace be won in Afghanistan?” published on the website of the Atlantic Council, writes that
it is extremely important for the United States to work out plan “B” for unforeseen circumstances,
including delaying or disrupting negotiations with the Taliban, in order to avoid a complete fiasco.
The expert does not specify what kind of plan “B” is, but it seems that, apart from building up
the military group, there are no other options yet 25 .
Trump sends envoys to Afghanistan to open talks directly with Taliban over peace deal by Ben Farmer, islamabad Rozina Sabur, Washington.
16 JULY 2018. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/07/16/trump-sends-envoys-afghanistan-open-talks-directly-taliban-peace/
25 Can Peace Be Won in Afghanistan? By Omar Samad, September 11, 2018. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/can-peace-
be-won-in-afghanistan
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