at a decision without the customary restraints of traditional judicial review and is a reflection of the strong public policy favoring the arbitration process . An arbitrator ’ s award is completely irrational “ if the decision is either mistaken on its face or so mistaken as to result in real injustice or constructive fraud .” A mistake by the arbitrator as to fact or law is not sufficient ground for overturning an arbitration award .
The Court held the arbitrator ’ s choice to use the cost of repairs to calculate Schafer ’ s damages was not completely irrational , nor was the arbitrator ’ s finding that the amount requested by Shafer was excessive . The Court further rejected Shafer ’ s request to expand the review of an arbitration award , holding it was bound by the statutory standard for reviewing arbitration awards and lacked authority to expand the grounds for vacating an arbitration award . The Court stated it was for the legislature to decide to modify N . D . C . C . § 32-29.3-23 and expand the grounds for vacating an arbitration award , not the Court .
Nodak Electric Cooperative , Inc ., v . N . D . Public Service Comm ., et . al ., 2022 ND 225 . Filed 12 / 8 / 22 .
Otter Tail Power Company provides electric service to the city of Drayton under a franchise agreement . In 2019 , Drayton annexed property known as McFarland ’ s Addition . Thereafter , Drayton passed a resolution requiring Otter Tail to provide electric service to McFarland ’ s Addition . Nodak Electric Cooperative provides electric services to rural customers outside of Drayton but does not provide service to any customers in McFarland ’ s Addition . Nodak does have a line running across the south side of McFarland ’ s Addition but does not have a franchise from Drayton to provide electric service in the city .
Nodak filed a complaint against Otter Tail with the Public Service Commission ( PSC ) to prohibit Otter Tail from extending electric service to McFarland ’ s Addition . Nodak alleged Otter Tail ’ s service would interfere with Nodak ’ s service and be an unreasonable duplication of services . Otter Tail responded by claiming the PSC lacked jurisdiction over Drayton ’ s decision .
The PSC denied Otter Tail ’ s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction , denied the relief sought by Nodak , and dismissed the complaint . Nodak appealed to the district court and then again to the Supreme Court .
The Court held Otter Tail ’ s motion to dismiss should have been granted because PSC did not have jurisdiction to hear Nodak ’ s complaint . The Court reasoned that Otter Tail did not extend its service outside of Drayton ’ s city limits and its extension did not interfere with another existing lawful service nor did it present an unreasonable duplication of services . As Nodak did not provide electric services to Drayton or the McFarland ’ s Addition or have a franchise with Drayton , the Court held the PSC was without jurisdiction under N . D . C . C . ch . 49-03 to hear Nodak ’ s complaint .
State v . Moses , 2022 ND 208 . Filed 11 / 23 / 22 .
In 2015 , the juvenile court entered an order finding Moses committed the delinquent act of theft of a dirt bike , which “ would be a Class C Felony if committed by an adult .” Under the Juvenile Court Act , an order of disposition of the juvenile court “ is not a conviction of crime .” In 2020 , Moses possessed a firearm at a shooting range . The state charged him with unlawfully possessing a firearm within five years after a felony conviction . Moses pled guilty , reserving his right to appeal . On appeal , Moses argued because N . D . C . C . § 62.1-02- 01 ( 2 ) requires a finding of guilt , either through plea or trial , the 2015 juvenile adjudication did not prohibit him from possessing a firearm and thus did not qualify as a predicate felony “ conviction .” The Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that the juvenile court determination that Moses had committed a delinquent act equivalent to a felony would be enough to satisfy the firearm prohibition statute , even if the determination was not a conviction itself .
Moses argued the firearm prohibition statute conflicted with several provisions of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act . The Court determined that although the Juvenile Court Act and the firearm prohibition statute conflict on the surface , they could be harmonized and construed to give effect to both statutes . The Court found the Juvenile Court Act provided the general rule that a juvenile adjudication is not a conviction of a crime , but that the firearm prohibition statute represented a special provision which must prevail over the general rule . As a result , the special provision of the firearm prohibition statute applied in this case , but only for the limited purposes of deciding whether Moses was prohibited from possessing a firearm . Moses also argued his due process rights were violated , as he was never advised of the firearm prohibition at the time of the juvenile court determination . The Court disagreed , noting the firearm prohibition was a collateral consequence , which the Court did not need to advise the defendant thereof .
Troubadour Oil and Gas , LLC v . The Honorable Joshua B . Rustad , et . al ., 2022 ND 191 . Filed 11 / 10 / 22 .
The district court issued a discovery order requiring Trobadour to disclose all communications between Troubadour ’ s counsel and Troubadour ’ s owner , who was also identified as an expert witness for Troubadour . Troubadour then petitioned for a supervisory writ on the grounds communications between its counsel and its owner were protected by attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine .
The Court granted the petition for a supervisory writ because the district court ’ s order to produce purported privileged communications is not appealable and therefore left Troubadour with the choice of disclosing purported privileged information or being held in contempt .
The Court held the district court abused its discretion in ordering the production of all communications between Troubadour ’ s counsel and its owner because the district court misapplied the law . Specifically , the district court ’ s order relied upon Fed . R . Civ . P . 26 and corresponding federal law . The Court determined N . D . R . Civ . P . 26 is materially different than the corresponding federal rule and North Dakota had
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