WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS OF POLITICAL POWER / TUTORIALOUTLET WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS OF POLITICAL POW | Page 4

as essentially similar to that of Hobbes. They point out that Locke
defended a hedonist theory of human
motivation (Essay 2.20) and claim that he must agree with Hobbes
about the essentially self-interested
nature of human beings. Locke, they claim, only recognizes natural
law obligations in those situations
where our own preservation is not in conflict, further emphasizing
that our right to preserve ourselves
trumps any duties we may have.
On the other end of the spectrum, more scholars have adopted the
view of Dunn, Tully, and Ashcraft that it
is natural law, not natural rights, that is primary. They hold that when
Locke emphasized the right to life,
liberty, and property he was primarily making a point about the duties
we have toward other people: duties
not to kill, enslave, or steal. Most scholars also argue that Locke
recognized a general duty to assist with
the preservation of mankind, including a duty of charity to those who
have no other way to procure their
subsistence (Two Treatises 1.42). These scholars regard duties as
primary in Locke because rights exist to
ensure that we are able to fulfill our duties. Simmons takes a position
similar to the latter group, but claims
that rights are not just the flip side of duties in Locke, nor merely a
means to performing our duties. Instead,
rights and duties are equally fundamental because Locke believes in a
“robust zone of indifference” in
which rights protect our ability to make choices. While these choices
cannot violate natural law, they are
not a mere means to fulfilling natural law either.
Another point of contestation has to do with the extent to which
Locke thought natural law could, in fact,
be known by reason. Both Strauss and Peter Laslett, though very
different in their interpretations of Locke
generally, see Locke's theory of natural law as filled with
contradictions. In the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, Locke defends a theory of moral knowledge that