Vermont Bar Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 Vermont Bar Journal, Summer 2019 | Page 36
by Leo Bisson, Esq.
Decision-Making at Mediation
Psychological Factors Influencing Outcomes
We recently saw the 100-year anniver-
sary of the war to end all wars. Sadly, the
stream of wars has never ended, and prob-
ably never will. All one must do is hear the
daily news to realize how fun≠damentally
fortunate we are to have a rule of law allow-
ing peaceful resolution of disputes. And to
have alternative dispute resolution process-
es to minimize the inefficiencies of litiga-
tion. Mediation and arbitration have sup-
plemented traditional methods of negoti-
ation to enable those involved in disputes
to have some decision-making control over
the outcome.
As a mediator of civil claims seeking re-
dress for personal and financial losses (most
commonly tort cases seeking a sum of mon-
ey), I have often pondered the factors trig-
gering acceptance or rejection of settle-
ment opportunities arising during sessions.
Over the course of about 1,000 mediations
in the last 20 years one observation stands
out as the most curious – parties sometimes
reach agreements they all would have re-
jected coming into the process. How could
that be? What changes to make a “no” a
“yes”?
I am not so naive as to credit the role of
the neutral alone for success at mediation,
nor fault one or both parties for failure. A
good and knowledgeable neutral certain-
ly can provide information about multiple
issues parties may consider, ranging from
the litigation process to points of evidence
and substantive law potentially applicable
to the dispute. In addition to providing in-
formation, a neutral may influence decision-
making, either intentionally or accidentally.
A mediator savvy in the science of Motiva-
tional Interviewing may be able to direct-
ly influence a party’s decision about set-
tlement. 1 Through empathetic listening,
open-ended questioning and restatement
of a party’s position, a motivational inter-
viewer can demonstrate discrepancies be-
tween a party’s objectives and current po-
sition such that a change of position and
movement towards compromise becomes
possible.
Naturally, counsel for the parties and oth-
er claims professionals involved in the pro-
cess influence the decision-making of the
parties. Again, this may be intentional or
accidental. Family and friends likewise may
have a bearing on a party’s view of case val-
ue and thus the position taken at media-
tion. The quest to understand how and why
decision-making at mediations is influenced
leads down an interesting path. Here I will
36
discuss some of the commonly encoun-
tered psychological factors. 2
In Michael Lewis’ novel, “The Undoing
Project,” he explores the life-long work of
two Israeli psychologists, Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman. 3 Working together and
employing numerous surveys, they dem-
onstrated that people in every social and
economic stratum make decisions about
a wide variety of things based on subcon-
scious rules of thumb they labeled “heuris-
tics.” They categorized heuristics as certain
ingrained principals which define the be-
havioral contours of human decision-mak-
ing. Contrary to utilitarian economic theory,
which posits that decisions are based on a
rational analysis of what is in a person’s best
interest, they demonstrated that people
often do not make decisions in their own
best financial interest. For example, most
people decide to take a sure $2,000 over a
50% chance to get $5,000, the statistically
best choice. Conversely, those same peo-
ple asked to choose between a sure loss
of $2,000 or 50% chance of losing $5,000
chose the latter. In the first case most opt-
ed for the sure thing over an even chance to
do 2.5 times better, whereas in the second
case they chose to chance a 2.5 times big-
ger loss rather than accept a smaller sure
loss. What Tversky and Kahneman came to
realize is most of us are risk averse when it
comes to a decision about a potential gain,
but risk taking when deciding about a loss
avoidance. 4 This trait forms the basis for
what they labeled as Prospect Theory.
Prospect Theory holds that financial de-
cisions must be viewed in relation to a per-
son’s reference point. For example, if of-
fered a raise of $5/hour one may consid-
er that satisfactory until learning that a co-
worker is offered a $10/hour raise for the
same work. Learning of the co-worker’s
raise creates an anticipation that one is en-
titled to the same, thus changing the point
of reference from which the offer of $5 is
measured. Prospect Theory also recogniz-
es certain other human characteristics that
factor into decision-making. Loss aversion
is a strong influence. Studies show most
people are willing to take greater risks to
avoid a loss than to realize a gain. Opti-
mism is another influential bias most share.
Kahneman describes how optimism creates
an “illusion of validity.” These and many
more behaviors routinely appearing in fi-
nancial decision-making influence the me-
diation process, whether consciously or
subconsciously. Prospect Theory and heu-
THE VERMONT BAR JOURNAL • SUMMER 2019
ristics impact the course of mediations in
many ways.
Anticipation. It is normal at mediation
for each party to anticipate the claim re-
sulting in a gain or loss. But whether an
amount of money either paid or received
is viewed as a true gain or loss depends on
each party’s reference point. And a party’s
reference point will surely include anticipa-
tion of some level of gain or loss from the
matter. The claimant likely anticipates re-
couping some level of financial gain to com-
pensate from their perceived loss, and the
defendant anticipates some loss in order to
resolve the claim. Anticipated gain or loss
informs that party’s status quo which in turn
forms the reference point from which a par-
ty will view a potential settlement as being
a true gain or loss.
Claimant’s anticipation of gain is un-
doubtedly influenced by their counsel, but
also by factors unrelated to the merits of
the claim, such as anecdotal information
about other cases, and personal needs.
For institutional clients and those repre-
sented by claims professionals, like insur-
ers, a more regimented hierarchical system
for anticipating status post resolution is in
place. In both cases, pre-determined an-
ticipated outcomes limit the flexibility of
the mediation process and require consid-
erable effort by the neutral to understand
when a proposal will be viewed as a true
gain by a claimant who is unlikely to forfeit
for a chance of doing better at trial, or a
loss by a defendant who is willing to take a
chance to avoid.
Learning what each party anticipates
from the outcome of the dispute is criti-
cal to understanding each party’s reference
point from which proposed settlements will
be viewed. It is further instrumental in mea-
suring any discrepancy between a party’s
position and anticipated outcome. And it
is the starting point from which the medi-
ator can begin to address the reasonable-
ness of a party’s ultimate goal for dispute
resolution.
Anchoring. The uncertainty of a ver-
dict or judgment in any given case affords
considerable room for both disagreement
among parties and influence by a skilled
neutral. When a sum cannot be calculated
mathematically and is subject to variables
and imprecision, it has repeatedly been
shown that a suggested amount will affect
the opinion of value decided on by an indi-
vidual. An example used by Kahneman is to
ask: “Do you think the average life expec-
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