INTERNATIONAL
VANDERBILT POLITICAL REVIEW
The trouble with Sony
Private terrorism and the public good
B
efore November 24, 2014, Seth
Rogen and James Franco would
not be associated with the term
cyberterrorism. If the duo were associated with any political issue, it was
drug policy, as they starred in several
drug themed comedies together, such as
Pineapple Express and This is the End.
All of that changed, however, when
their feature, The Interview, prompted
what is now likely the most famous
example of cyberterrorism in history.
The film had been controversial from
the time it was announced. The North
Korean government immediately called
it “a wanton act of terror” and promised
“merciless” retaliation upon its release.
Rhetoric like this is commonplace
for the North Korean government, and
is not typically accompanied by action.
Thus, when skeletal figures and threatening messages popped up on every
computer at Sony Pictures Entertainment on November 24th, it came as
a major shock. A group calling themselves the “Guardians of Peace” took
credit for the hack and threatened to
publish Sony’s secrets over the web.
Over the next few weeks the hackers
dumped a virtual landslide of sensitive information including employees’
personal information, memos featuring
scathing criticisms of industry figures
such as Adam Sandler and Angelina
Jolie, and racially insensitive emails
concerning President Obama sent by
high-level executives. On December
16th, the perpetrators made threats to
target any and all theaters that showed
the film. As a result, all major theater
chains dropped the film. Sony cancelled the release, only to backtrack and
release it in smaller theaters as well as
24
by WADE BOICH ‘15
through video on demand services such
as Google Play and Xbox Live. This
whole incident demonstrates the power
that cyberterrorists can wield over corporate actors, who do not have the same
ability to absorb material costs as states.
Regardless of the veracity of reports
of North Korean involvement, the act
and the intent behind exemplifies the
key characteristics of cyberterrorism.
aters face is real because they have to
balance freedom of expression with
safety and commerce.” The Interview
was made on a $44 million budget,
which is relatively large for a comedy,
but small in comparison to Sony Pictures’ $8 billion in revenue in 2014.
The cost of production is immaterial
when looking at Sony Corporation as
a whole. Meanwhile, had an attack oc-
When it comes to negotiating with
terrorists, the conventional wisdom has
been driven into the ground to the point of
cliché: don’t do it.
First, the hack not only disabled Sony’s computers for an extended period
of time, but also severely impeded its
business interests. This does not just
impact Sony employees, but also its
shareholders and business partners as
well as moviegoers at large. There is
little doubt that this was a severe disruption of American commerce. Additionally the “Guardians of Peace” made
direct and violent threats to theaters,
going so far as to claim that the attacks
would leave the world “full of fear.”
The hack was an obvious, politically
motivated attempt to censor a channel
of media through fear and blackmail.
To a corporation such as Sony, however, there was a whole separate aspect
of the hack to consider: the material
cost. Fareed Zakaria articulated the difficulty of Sony’s position, saying “The
challenge that movie studios and the-
curred at a showing of The Interview,
the legal costs alone would have been
staggering, not to mention the negative publicity that would have come
with putting moviegoers in harm’s
way. The situation was even more difficult for the theaters, which worried
not just about liability, but also about
potential customers staying home altogether because of the threats, which
would not only impact The Interview’s
gross, but those of all the other movies shown during that time period. This
can all be boiled down to one point:
corporations such as Sony and AMC
are legally obligated to act in the best
interests of their shareholders, meaning
that they cannot sacrifice profits or risk
litigation to stand on their principles.
When it comes to negotiating with
terrorists, the conventional wisdom
has been driven into the ground to the