MARCH 2014
ine the same troops—performing the
same military roles—take off their uniforms, put on civilians’ clothing. [...]
Are they no longer legitimate targets?”
Though this argument is nuanced, the
diplomatic repercussions of drone warfare
could nullify its benefits by reinforcing the
idea among Afghans that the United States
military is an invading force, not a liberating one. To the first order, civilians are
most concerned with the physical and economic wellbeing of themselves and their
families. As such, any insurgency wins
support among the local population by
providing security from outsiders. Whether or not American drones are achieving
strategic objectives becomes irrelevant to
villagers when their only interaction with
the American military is a Hellfire missile that leaves their livelihood in ruins.
Consider also the dehumanizing aspect of drone warfare. Whereas civilians
can interact with American troops on
the ground, and recognize their intent to
build a peaceful society, U.A.V.’s allow
for no such interaction. A single errant
Hellfire missile might undo an entire
decade of building trust between coalition forces and the leaders of a tribe.
Furthermore, the Soviet occupation of
the 1980’s is fresh in the Afghan psyche.
The Mi-24 helicopters represented an
intimidating aerial attack force, and to
an Afghan farmer, American drones
may recall the image of imperialism.
The main rebuttal to such a criticism of the U.S.A.F.’s drone strategy is
based on a simple comparison of civilians killed by drone strikes to civilians
killed by enemies. In the aforementioned speech at the National Defense
University, President Obama insisted,
“the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts
of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs
any estimate of civilian casualties from
drone strikes.” Though statistically accurate, this assertion overlooks the important Islamic tribal structure. In many
tribal cultures, and especially Islamic
tribes, a “culture of honor” develops
where each person’s livelihood is con-
FEATURE
tingent on their maintenance of a reputation of strength. Such a culture often
leads to frequent violence and swift retaliation, and the principal function of
a tribe is to curb this violence. When a
wrong is committed, or even perceived,
it is a person’s right and duty to restore
the honor of his tribesman through violent retaliation. The end result of this
social structure, as it pertains to drone
warfare, is a cultural ripple effect. Even
if the basic number of civilians killed by
drone strikes is fewer than the number
of civilians killed by the Taliban or AlQaeda, a single civilian casualty from a
U.A.V. could end up recruiting dozens
of enemy foot soldiers who feel compelled to restore their tribesman’s honor.
Even more puzzling, though, is that the
military has long recognized this dilemma
but continued to employ U.A.V.’s regularly. As detailed by Field Manual 3-24,
the 2006 handbook outlining the United
States’ counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine, “counterinsurgents should calculate carefully the type and amount of force
to be applied and who wields it for any
operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral
damage leads to the recruitment of fifty
more insurgents.” To President Obama’s
credit, data from the Bureau of Investi-
gative Journalism reflects a sharp decline in the use of drone warfare over the
course of his presidency, from 127 total
CIA drone strikes in 2010 to just twenty
seven in 2013. Likewise, only four civilians were reported killed in 2013, compared with 196 reported dead in 2010.
Despite this decline in collateral damage, civilian casualties and drone warfare
remain key sticking points in President
Karzai’s refusal to sign the Afghanistan
Security Pact, which would maintain
an American presence for the foreseeable future. In a New York Times article, Hamid Karzai made his stance
clear: “for as long as such arbitrary
acts and oppression of foreign forces
continue, the security agreement with
the United States will not be signed.”
Even with the continued use of
U.A.V.’s, the Taliban maintains strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Should Karzai ultimately refuse the
security pact, and deny the United States
the chance to stabilize Afghanistan in ѡ