Vanderbilt Political Review Winter 2014 | Page 17

MARCH 2014 ine the same troops—performing the same military roles—take off their uniforms, put on civilians’ clothing. [...] Are they no longer legitimate targets?” Though this argument is nuanced, the diplomatic repercussions of drone warfare could nullify its benefits by reinforcing the idea among Afghans that the United States military is an invading force, not a liberating one. To the first order, civilians are most concerned with the physical and economic wellbeing of themselves and their families. As such, any insurgency wins support among the local population by providing security from outsiders. Whether or not American drones are achieving strategic objectives becomes irrelevant to villagers when their only interaction with the American military is a Hellfire missile that leaves their livelihood in ruins. Consider also the dehumanizing aspect of drone warfare. Whereas civilians can interact with American troops on the ground, and recognize their intent to build a peaceful society, U.A.V.’s allow for no such interaction. A single errant Hellfire missile might undo an entire decade of building trust between coalition forces and the leaders of a tribe. Furthermore, the Soviet occupation of the 1980’s is fresh in the Afghan psyche. The Mi-24 helicopters represented an intimidating aerial attack force, and to an Afghan farmer, American drones may recall the image of imperialism. The main rebuttal to such a criticism of the U.S.A.F.’s drone strategy is based on a simple comparison of civilians killed by drone strikes to civilians killed by enemies. In the aforementioned speech at the National Defense University, President Obama insisted, “the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes.” Though statistically accurate, this assertion overlooks the important Islamic tribal structure. In many tribal cultures, and especially Islamic tribes, a “culture of honor” develops where each person’s livelihood is con- FEATURE tingent on their maintenance of a reputation of strength. Such a culture often leads to frequent violence and swift retaliation, and the principal function of a tribe is to curb this violence. When a wrong is committed, or even perceived, it is a person’s right and duty to restore the honor of his tribesman through violent retaliation. The end result of this social structure, as it pertains to drone warfare, is a cultural ripple effect. Even if the basic number of civilians killed by drone strikes is fewer than the number of civilians killed by the Taliban or AlQaeda, a single civilian casualty from a U.A.V. could end up recruiting dozens of enemy foot soldiers who feel compelled to restore their tribesman’s honor. Even more puzzling, though, is that the military has long recognized this dilemma but continued to employ U.A.V.’s regularly. As detailed by Field Manual 3-24, the 2006 handbook outlining the United States’ counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine, “counterinsurgents should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.” To President Obama’s credit, data from the Bureau of Investi- gative Journalism reflects a sharp decline in the use of drone warfare over the course of his presidency, from 127 total CIA drone strikes in 2010 to just twenty seven in 2013. Likewise, only four civilians were reported killed in 2013, compared with 196 reported dead in 2010. Despite this decline in collateral damage, civilian casualties and drone warfare remain key sticking points in President Karzai’s refusal to sign the Afghanistan Security Pact, which would maintain an American presence for the foreseeable future. In a New York Times article, Hamid Karzai made his stance clear: “for as long as such arbitrary acts and oppression of foreign forces continue, the security agreement with the United States will not be signed.” Even with the continued use of U.A.V.’s, the Taliban maintains strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Should Karzai ultimately refuse the security pact, and deny the United States the chance to stabilize Afghanistan in ѡ