Vanderbilt Political Review Fall 2015 | Page 28

VANDERBILT POLITICAL REVIEW INTERNATIONAL 11.10.2009 The begining of the end T he Greek Crisis is a story of financial irresponsibility and overconfidence of not only the Greeks, but more importantly the international bond market and the IMF. This summer has been riddled by news of Greece’s inability to repay its loan to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Yet, in order to understand the full story of the Greek crisis, we need to look much farther back than the country’s current lack of capital. Some may argue that Greece’s crisis started as early as 1999, when it joined the Eurozone with a subpar economic structure and comparatively lower growth prospects than other EU members. In 1999, the Euro was phased in as a common currency to bolster the economic viability of European nations by minimizing trade costs within the region and increasing total trade. Yet, some countries, like Germany, were more produc- by SYDNEY BUB ‘18 tive than others and were dominated by industries that benefitted from economic trends. Within the Eurozone, Greece was less competitive and possessed less profitable export options and materials, ultimately causing the nation to have a consistent trade deficit and high federal debt. Although Greece’s trade deficit and structural economic weaknesses undoubtedly played a role in the current crisis, going as far back as 1999 is a bit extreme in terms of assigning direct blame. However, November 10, 2009 stands out as a poignant day in Greece’s financial tumble. Much of the Eurozone has been riddled with financial turmoil since 2009, with five sovereign debt crises occurring since the start of the Great Recession. In 2009, Greece announced that its budget deficit would more than quadruple the EU’s three percent limit and would be an unacceptable 12.9 percent of GDP, mak- ing it the first Eurozone nation to have a sovereign debt crisis. This announcement highlighted many structural flaws and weaknesses in the Greece economy and spurred international credit rating agencies, like Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, to drop Greece’s credit ratings, discouraging current and potential investors. Fears about Greece’s economy were exacerbated by the discovery that Greece’s government had misreported deficits and debt levels. Greece’s high budget deficit, combined with its lack of credibility internationally made it impossible for Greece to borrow more and finance its deficits and meet its obligations. Had Greece not been a member of the Eurozone, with centralized and coordinated monetary policy, it could have been able to strategically depreciate its currency to pay off debt and increase investment. Due to its Euro membership, Greece instead cut wages to remain