turn , relies on , ‘ the praxis of those who talk together in order to act in common .’ 23 What Habermas finds in Arendt ’ s work , then , is the central idea of people , through the acts of discussion and communication , coming to some kind of common agreement with each other in the public sphere . This interpretation of her work develops Arendtian power in such a way as to emphasise a kind of unilateral agreement that Habermas sees as necessary for common action . This is important insofar it helps us to draw out a fundamental characteristic of Arendt ’ s theory that often goes overlooked . That is to say that , as Canovan correctly notes , Habermas overlooks a crucial element of Arendtian power by suggesting that it relies on the unity of opinion and , in fact , misreads Arendt by suggesting that her use of language necessitates a uniformity within political discourse that she does not , in fact , endorse . 24
What is potentially illuminating for our understanding of Arendtian power , then , is that unlike the impression given by Habermas ’ misreading of her work , Arendt ’ s understanding of power actually stresses the fundamental nature of disagreements that will undoubtedly occur within the public sphere . As Canovan notes , ‘ the most fundamental point is that Arendt did not share Habermas ’ crucial belief in the possibility of rational consensus on political questions .’ 25 Arendt was all too aware that human beings , by the very fact of their plurality , are perhaps incapable of perfect agreement in political matters . Arendt ’ s point is rather that , although we might not be able to form wholly unified opinions with each other , we are , nonetheless , capable of coming together in a shared public setting that we all inhabit . Thus , Arendt is not arguing that in order to create power , we must necessarily and unilaterally agree with one another but that our ability to create power comes from the very fact that we are capable of coming together in the first place . In this sense , Arendt ’ s conclusions about the possibility of creating power aren ’ t as grand as Habermas would have us believe . Arendt does not think that unanimity is required , or is even possible , in order for practical political decisions to be made or for the establishment of political power , instead the formation of power in the first place relies on the commitment to a shared public world in which we discuss and debate any disagreements that we do have in order to arrive at some kind of compromise or agreeable political arrangement . 26
23
Jürgen Habermas , “ Hannah Arendt ’ s Communications Concept of Power ”, Social Research , Vol . 1 , No . 44 ( 1977 ), 21
24
Margaret Canovan , “ A Case of Distorted Communication : A Note on Habermas and Arendt ”, Political Theory , Vol . 11 , No . 1 , ( 1983 ), 105-116
25 ibid , 109
26
This is why , for Arendt , the ideas of making and keeping political promises are so important because , through acting and speaking to one another in the public realm , we must be able to rely on the idea that we can trust in one another to be fair and equitable when discussing disagreements .