Under Construction @ Keele 2017 Under Construction @ Keele Vol. III (3) | Page 36

of a conflict. 7 In contrast, other similarly combat-rejecting groups view the offering of
medical help or even fire watching as being indirectly supportive of a war effort, and
therefore consider it unethical. Many pacifist groups have been primarily religious in
nature, and although many have a Christian basis, a large and important non-
Christian religion espousing a very extreme form of pacifism, known as Jainism, is
representative of the South and East Asian tradition of religious pacifism. Jains seek
to embody absolute pacifism in every aspect of their lives. While walking, for
example, adherents brush the path ahead of them so as not to step on insects, and
some even filter water in order to avoid harming any micro-organisms which may be
present. 8
The focus of this paper is “absolute” pacifism, in which no violence, and in
some cases not even resistance, is permitted under any circumstances. However, in
seeking to demonstrate that this form is actually part of the spectrum of contingent
pacifism, my assertion is that this distinction does not exist. However, for clarity I
need to outline the qualitative difference which has wrongly been perceived between
“absolute” and less extreme forms of pacifism, before demonstrating that this
distinction is merely one of degree. A fundamental divide in analyses of pacifism is
between utilitarian justifications for its adoption and those who approach the same
issue from a deontological stance. Utilitarian critics are quick to raise the example of
Nazi Germany, which they offer as representing a situation in which absolute
pacifism is not merely dangerous to the individual, but actually (they claim) deeply
immoral, in that it promotes a strategy which would not defend the millions of
civilians threatened by Hitler but would, in contrast, result in their deaths. A similar
but individual-level argument is that the absolute rejection of violence, and even of
resistance, in the course of personal defence implies that a person should not resist
the actions of an assailant; again, this is offered as a supposedly overwhelming
reason for the rejection of absolute or maximal pacifism. 9 None of the above is of
any relevance if a “deontological” stance is adopted. From such a standpoint, the
value of pacifism is understood in and of itself, rather than on the basis of its effects
or results. Returning to the example of Nazi Germany, a deontological supporter of
7
Don Rowe (with Isabel Cartwright), Conviction: A World War I Critical Thinking Project (London:
Quaker Peace & Social Witness (QPSW), Britain Yearly Meeting, 2014).
8
Jeffery D. Long, Jainism: An Introduction (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2009), 3.
9
S. Blake Hereth, “Against Self-Defense,” (Master’s Degree Thesis, University of Arkansas, 2014),
243.