Under Construction Journal Issue 6.1 UNDER CONSTRUCTION JOURNAL 6.1 | Page 77
figure, then there is an institution that deters us from wrongdoing. When we have a restraining figure,
there is a constant fear that if we commit oppression then we would be punished. Therefore, when we
consider normative questions about our obligations towards the state, political obligation can be justified
in pragmatic terms. Without political obligation, there would be anarchy and oppression. Wolff’s assertion
that political obligation contradicts moral autonomy is not an effective refutation of political obligation:
our autonomy could impede others’ liberties to life and property. Hobbes challenges anarchists with the
following edict:
“Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe . . . when
going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he
knows there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him…
Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words [sic]?”
This passage convincingly illustrates how much security a political structure brings to our lives. Political
obligation is crucial, as we stand to gain more than we lose. In terms of rational decision-making, it is
viable to bargain with the ruler. In exchange for protection, we merely obey the state at a minimal level.
We can continue with our daily lives, knowing that the state will protect us if required. Therefore, it is
rational to obey the state. However, I argue that we cannot always be expected to obey the state. I will
now elucidate when political obligation becomes void.
Three-dimensional model of political obligation
I advance a three-dimensional model of political obligation. The dimensions are immediate rulership,
intermediate rulership, and the state’s telos. Immediate rulership refers to how the subjects and the
government should act to deal with an issue, such as factions. Consequentialism resolves a political
turmoil by convincing all to establish a polity. Even if we cannot normatively justify political obligation,
politics was established as a consequentialist solution to factions and disorder. Intermediate rulership is
concerned with how the ruler and the subjects are to comport with each other. The most effective way
to maintain a state is to legitimate the state in contractualist terms, namely, protection renders
obedience; or, when we vote, we give consent to the ruler to govern our affairs. The third dimension
refers to the telos of the state.
My consideration of teleology—which is the third dimension of the framework that I propose—is
concerned with the natural progression of the state towards its objective, which is the respect of the
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