Under Construction Journal Issue 6.1 UNDER CONSTRUCTION JOURNAL 6.1 | Page 75

it respects our rights and liberties. In this paper, I transcend beyond the Western canon of thought by
comparing the 14 th Century Muslim Polymath, Ibn Khaldūn, and the 17 th Century British philosopher,
Hobbes. My paper will undertake a twogfold procedure. Firstly, I will challenge the philosophical
anarchism of Wolff, in terms of Ibn Khaldūn and Hobbes’s arguments about human nature. Then, I will
appraise the telos of political obligation, and I will briefly outline when political obligation becomes void
by referring to Modi’s ostensibly democratic, but arguably de facto fascist, regime in India. I will conclude
that political obligation is binding if the state is progressing towards the desired telos, as we would be in
a more precarious situation if we were to live in anarchy. However, if the state is tyrannical, it is pointless
to obey the state.
Challenging Philosophical Anarchism
The philosophical anarchist, Wolff, posits that political obligation opposes our ‘refusal to be ruled.’ As
there is no adequate theory that justifies our obligation, for instance, a contractual basis of political
obligation, we cannot be obliged to obey the state. As the state opposes our autonomy, the state lacks
legitimacy. Wolff’s argument is contingent on the premise that our autonomy is the ‘primary moral
desideratum’, namely, our autonomy is essential for us to be moral beings. Suissa posits that ‘this premise
is questionable’, challenging the view that we must have autonomy to be moral beings. Consequently, a
major issue is that one would be obliged to consider whether ‘an autonomous man will only act on certain
kinds of reasons.’ If X refrains from injuring Y, we must consider whether this is due to a genuine
consideration of the pain that would be induced, or if the action due to the fear of being prosecuted. If
there were no institutions to avenge oppression, X might not have any regard for the welfare of Y. The
argument that we need a restraining figure can be conceptualised with the following example. A spies
through the keyhole to listen to the conversation of B and C. However, if A sees a CCTV camera above
their head, A might refrain from eavesdropping. Hence, authority, and the possibility of accountability,
influences our behaviour. Ibn Khaldūn remarks the following to demonstrate how we can become
misanthropic:
“Evil is the closest quality to man when he fails to improve his customs and when religion is not
used as the model to improve him . . . Evil qualities in man are injustice and mutual aggression.
He who casts his eye upon the property of his brother will lay his hand upon it to take it, unless
there is a restraining figure to hold him back.”
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