with Symonds ’ account from many of the examples used by Stace is that Symonds did not find it a pleasant experience .
Finally , there remains an onus on non-hard constructivists to explain the varying language and underlying assumptions in reports of mystical experience which Katz has correctly pointed out . This may be done by acknowledging that the individual will try to make sense of their experience by drawing on their prior knowledge and understanding ; in other words , the difference may be in the interpretation and not the experience itself . 22
Conclusion
As the examples above demonstrate , Katz ’ s rule that all experiences are constructed from pre-existing factors may be challenged in a number of ways . Most non-hard constructivists would not wish to deny that experiences are mediated in ‘ extremely complex epistemological ways ’ both in terms of what we already know , believe , and expect , and how we interpret experiences afterwards as Katz claims . 23 However , there is a distinction between this and the idea that experiences must be entirely constructed from those mediating factors , allowing no possibility of new or novel experiences or the insights which might arise from them . Non-hard constructivists are not necessarily universalists ; they simply challenge the idea that all experiences are entirely mediated and constructed by preexisting conceptual and linguistic frameworks . However , if the hard constructivist case may be successfully challenged , this leaves open the possibility of some kind of universal mystical experience , or at least of some universal features for some types of mystical experience , which are independent of the particular religious , philosophical , and linguistic contexts they arise from . There also seems to be no reason why such experiences should not influence an individual ’ s outlook and understanding and , in the right circumstances , affect theological and philosophical positions .
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