God and Evil: An Inquiry
Josiah Jordan
Over the centuries, theist and atheist philosophers alike have
converged upon a common point of belief that the funda-
mental characteristics of God, whether God exists or not, are
omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. For one to
describe some being that is omniscient and omnipotent but
not omnibenevolent, or omnipotent and omnibenevolent but
not omniscient, or any such combination that fails to recon-
cile the coexistence of these three traits, would be for one to
describe something other than God. And if it be the case that
God is not simultaneously all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-
good, we have good reason to believe that God does not, in
that God cannot, exist. If we can, however, then perhaps we
have one more reason to believe that such a God does.
ment that attempts to reconcile the coexistence of God and
evil, beginning with the claim that perhaps God simply cannot
properly eliminate every evil state of affairs. In other words,
it may be possible that there are things God is incapable of
performing in spite of His omnipotence, yet, as it accords with
His omnibenevolence. Take, for instance, the possibility that
Jack suffers from a minor cut on his finger, while Jill takes
great pleasure in Jack’s pain. If we conjoin Jack’s pain with
Jill’s pleasure, we may consider the resulting conjunctive state of
affairs to be good, rather than evil, since we would be amiss
to take Jack’s subtle annoyance toward the cut as outweighing
the great pleasure Jill receives from it. 1 For God to eliminate
Jack’s pain is, effectively, to eliminate an outweighing good
that results from it; and while this may seem trivial or even
Alongside this conception of God, theists and atheists con- slippery, Plantinga asserts that the mere possibility that there
verge at a common point of belief in the experienced reality be an outweighing good state of affairs that necessarily results
of evil. However, it is at this same point of convergence where from some evil, which thus makes the conjunctive state of af-
their commitments to the notion of God also diverge, for it is fairs good, suggests that God cannot eliminate every evil state
the very undeniable reality of evil in the
of affairs—namely, those from which out-
For,
when
we
allow
God
to
be-
world that shakes one’s confidence in the
weighing goods come about. For, as Plant-
co-reality of a God Who is truly all-know- come the third-person party... inga recognizes, it wouldn’t be a complete
ing, all-powerful, and all-good. If God is our perspectives shift focus; subversion against the goodness of God
indeed omniscient and omnipotent, would for while we see absolute for Him to not eliminate every evil but,
it not then be within God’s power to prop- evil, God sees absolute good. rather, for Him to prevent outweighing
erly eliminate every evil state of affairs?
goods from occurring by eliminating those
And if He doesn’t, would it not then be a complete contradic- necessary, concomitant evils. Despite how evil it is to strip
tion against His omnibenevolence? That is, if God has fore- someone naked and whip them to a pulp and hammer nails
knowledge of some evil that will occur, why would He not 1 Here, I am simply taking after the nature of an example Plantinga
eliminate it unless He were not capable of doing so? And yet, uses and am aware that it is controversial and taps into a discussion
if He were capable, why hasn’t He eliminated that evil? Given involving the ethics of taking pleasure in someone else’s pain. The
purpose of this example is to show that Jill’s pleasure, in and of itself,
all of the evils in this world, what does this suggest about God?
In response to these pressing worries that have challenged the
theistic worldview, 2017 Templeton Prize winner, Christian,
and analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga provides an argu-
16 Spring 2019
is a good; Jack’s pain is, in and of itself, an evil; and Jill’s pleasure
as being caused by Jack’s pain doesn’t make that pleasure an evil,
necessarily. Plantinga would argue that pleasure is a necessary good,
and evil is a necessary evil, regardless of how each came about (i.e.,
pleasure in someone else’s pain is still pleasure, and though it can be
perceived as evil, it doesn’t change the fact that it’s pleasure).