by the region ’ s remoteness . The central administration had no real foothold in Sangin and the locals had never been under any strong government writ . Moreover , the locals were neither keen on the state trying to influence the area and impose itself nor were they particularly welcoming of foreign entry . Ethnic differences also contributed to tension between the locals and government forces . The isolation was also felt by the 3 Rifles , who were isolated , lacking direct links to other NATO units . This made policing the area very difficult , because a large area of control could not be easily set up , nor was it possible to prevent terrorists from entering and leaving the region . The Sangin valley was also involved in the opium trade and attempts to shut it down were met with resistance , particularly as it was the livelihood of many residents . This problem could also never truly be resolved as the key figures in the business were rarely in the country , let alone the Sangin valley .
Another struggle faced by the 3 Rifles was the anti-West sentiments present in Sangin . This was not , however , a result of the NATO agreements with the Northern Alliance or anything similarly political . These sentiments could be attributed to the isolated nature of Sangin . Col . Kitson spoke of how ‘ they didn ’ t want any foreigners there at all and the levels of education and understanding were so low that , to them there was probably no difference between us and the Russians of the 1980s or indeed the Brits of the 1880s . It was all part of the continuum of foreign invaders .’ This of course meant that to the people of Sangin the Taliban were equally foreign , but harsh reprisals and an iron fist kept everyone in line . These people , ideally , just wanted to be left alone .
One of the key objectives of the British in Sangin was winning over the people . This was to dissuade them from supporting the Taliban and to bolster their support for the Afghan government . The technique used by the 3 Rifles was that of ‘ courageous restraint ’. It avoided the use of heavy firearms in civilian areas and tried to build connections between the soldier and the civilian . Col . Kitson lauded its effectiveness and stressed the importance of using this tactic . However , this tactic often posed a threat to the soldiers . Col Kitson explained : ‘ Regarding the whole business about suicide bombers , if you ’ re patrolling and meant to be a friend of the civilian population , if you won ’ t let anyone come within 20 feet of you without lifting their shalwar kameez and showing to you that they ’ re not a suicide bomber , you ’ re not going to develop a great relationship with the locale . Firstly , because you are inconveniencing them and also because you are humiliating them .’
One of the key objectives of the entire campaign was the creation of an effective fighting force capable of effectively engaging the Taliban . Col . Kitson talked about the work done alongside the ANA ( Afghan National Army ) in Helmand . His brother , Lt . Col . Jonny Kitson ( H , 1984-9 ) had also worked with the ANA , the previous year . An army in its infancy , the ANA faced a number of difficulties . Its soldiers did not receive pay regularly and were not given leave . This led to the temptation to be corrupt . Moreover , soldiers were not always led by effective commanders , many of whom would disappear at key moments , taking with them vital resources . Sangin was also a far more dangerous posting and soldiers were often unhappy to be designated to the area . However , it was not all doom and gloom . They were described as ‘ brave as lions who dared to do things many of us wouldn ’ t ’. They would often pull out IEDs , having attached them to a string . Despite all their problems , the soldiers tried to get on with the tasks at hand . It has also gradually developed into a more effective force . Even in 2009 the ANA had begun to take control of minor operations and worked under the supervision of foreign forces . The police force was however , a disaster . Col . Kitson emphasised that for the police force and ANA to really become an effective modern fighting force , they needed good resources and strong and honest leaders , as well as well-established , comprehensive training regimes .
Alongside the development of the ANA , Col . Kitson talked also of the development goals and principle of ‘ alternate livelihoods ’. These initiatives sought to improve the lives of the locale and to change the allegiance from the
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