extensive trove of internal company emails .
From the beginning , those records show , meatpacking executives used their clout with the USDA to influence health decisions made at the highest levels of the Trump administration .
In March 2020 , the industry pushed for the USDA to be involved in the White House Coronavirus Task Force and to help ensure that meatpacking workers were classified as “ critical infrastructure ” workers so they would be exempted from governors ’ stay-at-home orders .
The industry was fortunate to have the USDA as its “ primary regulator ,” Potts wrote in an email to colleagues . “ Officials at USDA are moving more quickly than other agencies and representing our industry ’ s interests in every important interagency decision ,” she said .
Within weeks , Trump ’ s agriculture secretary , Sonny Perdue , set up a call between the CEOs of Tyson , Smithfield and other meatpackers and Vice President Mike Pence . That same day , during a White House press briefing , Pence heeded the industry ’ s request to address recent worker absences , telling meatpacking workers to “ show up and do your job .”
A spokesperson for the University System of Georgia , where Perdue is now chancellor , declined to comment on his behalf , saying Perdue was now “ focused on his new position serving the students of Georgia .”
After Smithfield ’ s Sioux Falls plant was shut down in April 2020 , the emails show , Sullivan took a uniquely aggressive stance , one that even some of his colleagues in the meat industry bristled at .
When the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued draft recommendations to reduce COVID-19 at the plant , Sullivan marked up a copy , starring in the margins strategies that he deemed “ problematic ” for the aging plant . In response , the CDC added multiple qualifiers saying Smithfield should implement the recommendations only “ if feasible .”
“ It really muddies the guidance when we start putting these waffle words into it ,” Dr . Henry Walke , then-director of CDC ’ s Division of Preparedness and Emerging Infections told the subcommittee , according to excerpts from an interview transcript . “ I felt that was watering down our guidance .”
Sullivan and others in the industry meanwhile misled the public about an impending meat shortage that they said would result if plants closed temporarily , the subcommittee said . After the Smithfield plant suspended operations , Sullivan said the closures were “ pushing our country perilously close to the edge in terms of our meat supply .” Days later , however , Smithfield urged the North American Meat Institute to issue a statement to reassure international customers that “ there was plenty of meat ” for export .
In emails , the trade group ’ s leaders said Sullivan was “ directing the panic ” and “ intentionally scaring people ,” creating a “ mess ” that they ’ d have to clean up .
Smithfield spokesperson Monroe said , “ The concerns we expressed were very real and we are thankful that a food crisis was averted .”
As the coronavirus spiraled through meatpacking towns , Potts of the North American Meat Institute began to fret , noting in an email that “ plants are being closed ” and “ health departments are showing up unannounced at plants .”
She wrote , “ It seems to be cascading and our friends at USDA and the VP ’ s office are not able to stop it .”
But at almost the exact same moment , Tyson ’ s CEO was emailing the head of Smithfield about his idea for an executive order .
Within two days , Tyson ’ s vice president and associate general counsel circulated a draft order that would invoke the president ’ s powers under a Korean War-era law called the Defense Production Act . And meatpacking executives agreed they should send it to the White House .
Tyson ’ s vice president of government relations called it a “ long shot ,” but said , “ I think we have a good momentum for a Hail Mary !”
When some in the industry expressed concern that such an ask could come across as “ production at any cost ,” Potts once again leaned on the industry ’ s connections with the USDA , sending the draft to top agency officials who passed on the request to the White House .
In the days leading up to the executive order , meatpacking industry representatives were in constant communication with the White House and USDA , the subcommittee records show . Sullivan and White held calls with Trump ’ s chief of staff , Mark Meadows , which were followed by a request from Meadows for White to meet directly with Trump . And the president held a call with meatpacking executives on the morning he issued the executive order .
The order had an immediate effect , as health officials in Virginia backed off a recommendation to close a plant and officials in Utah cited the order as the reason they couldn ’ t shut a plant down .
Thousands of meatpacking workers would continue to crowd into processing plants , risking contracting the virus and bringing it home to their families .
A few months later , when the Trump administration issued plans to reopen schools , executives at the North American Meat Institute privately struck a different tone . They questioned whether bringing students back together without a vaccine — what they had done with meatpacking workers — was a good idea for kids in their area .
“ This is just astounding ,” wrote Bill Westman , a senior vice president for the trade group . “ How can anyone guarantee that schools can ‘ safely reopen ’ under the circumstances as cases are surging across the USA ? Why put students and extended families at risk ?
“ This administration is living in an alternative and dangerous reality .”
This article was produced by ProPublica and originally appeared on their website .
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