conspiracy emerged and went viral . Election officials explained that ballots were printed in such a way that no vote would be undetected or misread . But that barely dented the erroneous assumption and false conclusion that a presidential election was being stolen before their eyes .
“ Sometimes misinformation stands for false evidence , or even vague [ evidence ] or deep fakes [ forged audio , photos or video ], or whatever ,” Starbird said . “ But more often , misinformation comes in the form of misrepresentations , misinterpretations , and mischaracterizations … the frame that we use to interpret that evidence ; and those frames are often strategically shaped by political actors and campaigns .”
In 2023 , online influencers do not even have to mention the triggering frames , she said , as their audiences already know them . Influencers can pose questions , selectively surface evidence , and knowingly — in wink and nod fashion — create a collaboration where witting and unwitting actors produce and spread false content and conclusions . Additionally , the technical architecture of social media — where platforms endlessly profile users based on their posts , and those profiles help to customize and deliver targeted content — is another factor that amplifies its spread .
Starbird ’ s summary of the dynamics of disinformation is more nuanced than what one hears in election circles , where officials avoid commenting publicly on partisan passions . But she was not the only researcher with insights into how and where mis- and disinformation are likely to surface in 2024 . Eviane Leidig , a postdoctoral fellow at Tilburg University in the Netherlands , described another conduit during the conference where “ personal radicalization and recruitment narratives ” may be hiding in plain sight : influencer-led lifestyle websites .
Leidig showed seemingly innocuous pages from influencers that use “ the qualities of being relatable , authentic , accessible , and responsive to their audiences to cultivate the perception of intimacy .” As they shared their personal stories , Leidig pointed to instances where influencers ’ extreme views filtered in and became part of the community experience . “ The messaging [ is ] to sell both a lifestyle and an ideology in order to build a fundamental in-group identity ,” she said , which , in turn , ends up “ legitimizing and normalizing … their political ideology .” The reality that many factors shape beliefs , identity , community , and a sense of belonging means that unwinding false rumors , misconceptions , and lies — indeed , changing minds — is more complicated than merely presenting facts , said Cristina López G ., a senior analyst at Graphika , which maps social media , during her talk on the dynamics of rabid online fandom at the 2023 Trust and Safety Research Conference .
López G . studied how some of Taylor Swift ’ s online fans harassed and abused other fans over the superstar ’ s purported sexuality — whether she was “ secretly queer .” The “ Gaylors ,” who believed Swift was gay or bisexual , shared “ tips about how to preserve their anonymity online ,” López G . said . They anonymously harassed others . They used coded language . They censored others . Their mob-like dynamics and behavior are not that different from what can be seen on pro-Trump platforms that attacked RINOs — the pejorative for “ Republicans In Name Only ” — or anyone else outside their sect .
“ Fandoms are really microcosms of the internet ,” López G . said . “ Their members are driven by the same thing as every Internet user , which is just establish their dominance , and safeguard their community beliefs , and beliefs become really closely tied to who they are online … who they identify as online .”
In other words , changing minds is neither easy nor quick , and , in many circles , not welcomed .
“ What this means is that real-world events do very little to change this belief ,” López G . concluded , adding this observation also applied to political circles . “ If you change beliefs , you ’ re no longer part of that community … So , it ’ s not really , ‘ what ’ s real ?’ and ‘ what ’ s not ?’ It ’ s really the friends we ’ ve made along the way .”
“ Once you begin to see this phenomenon through that lens [ where disinformation is participatory and tribal ], you realize it ’ s everywhere ,” Starbird said .
‘ Counter-Influencers ’
At the Aspen Cyber Summit , the elections panel offered a sober view of the strategies undertaken during the Trump era , and challenges facing election defenders in and outside of government in 2024 .
To date , the response essentially has been twofold . As Chris Krebs explained , “ Information warfare has two pillars . One is information technical ; the other is information psychological .” Krebs ran CISA — the U . S . Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency — during the Trump administration . He was fired after 2020 Election Day for retweeting that the election was “ the most secure in American history .” As he told the audience , “ It was also the most litigated election . The most scrutinized election . The most audited election . I could go on …”
On the “ information technical ” side , Krebs said that officials have learned to protect election computers and data . There was no indication that anyone manipulated any jurisdictions ’ computers in recent cycles . But that achievement mostly took place inside government offices and behind closed doors . It has not been fully appreciated by voters , especially by partisans who do not believe that their side lost .
Instead , what many disappointed voters have seen of election operations has preyed on their insecurities — such as Starbird ’ s Sharpiegate example . In other words , the technical successes have been offset by what Krebs called “ information psychological .” The strategy to respond to this dynamic , he and others said , is to curtail propaganda ’ s rapid spread on both fronts .
Some of that challenge remains technical , such as having contacts in online platforms who can flag or remove bogus content , they said . But the most potentially impactful response , at least with interrupting propaganda ’ s viral dynamics , hinges on cultivating what Leidig called “ counter-influencers ,” and
68 x The Trial Lawyer