resulted in billions of misallocated and misspent taxpayer dollars .”
The analysis cites reports by the DOD Inspector General ( DODIG ) and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction ( SIGAR ). In one case involving insufficient voucher reviews for a major contract from 2015 to 2017 , the new report notes , “ one-fifth of them had questionable or undocumented expenses , totaling over $ 536 million .”
In another case , SIGAR found that “ a subcontractor of Lockheed Martin submitted fraudulent invoices that resulted in overbilling the Department of Defense millions of dollars .”
Peltier ’ s report also points to government watchdogs ’ findings of “ incomplete and shoddy construction of school buildings , warehouses , and other facilities ” as well as “ bribery of U . S . officials to secure contracts .” SIGAR , in its quarterly report to Congress this past January , “ conservatively estimated nearly 30 % of U . S . appropriations for Afghanistan reconstruction from 2009 to 2019 was lost to waste , fraud , and abuse .” The Pentagon was responsible for the bulk of that spending .
The Brown analysis explains that “ the overpayment of illegitimate expenses , and the lack of oversight of contracts by DOD was compounded by yet another problem : In some cases , contractors were hired to perform oversight of other contractors , in lieu of the oversight that should have been performed by DOD .”
Peltier told Responsible Statecraft — which exclusively reported on the new document — that the DODIG “ also found oversight by the DOD itself to be insufficient or poorly executed , so really the oversight problems are both ‘ the fox guarding the hen house ’ as well as internal issues ( which in some cases are because of corruption , and in other cases just poor execution ).”
The researcher suggested that to help prevent abuse , “ there should be a committee or other body to make determinations of whether certain contracts can legitimately be labeled as ‘ undisclosed .’“
“ I would recommend the DOD reduce its contracting overall and return to providing more services in-house ,” Peltier added , referencing “ services like weapons maintenance and security , but also things like food services and lodging , in order to have more command in fulfilling its own needs and reduce the use of contracts and the opportunities for waste , fraud , and abuse .”
In a statement , Stephanie Savell , codirector of the Costs of War Project , put Peltier ’ s findings about Pentagon contractor spending into a broader context .
“ One hundred billion is an enormous amount of money , but it ’ s also just a drop in the bucket when it comes to the full costs of the post- 9 / 11 wars ,” Savell noted .
“ Nearly a million people have lost their lives in these wars and
U . S . taxpayers have paid over $ 2.3 trillion for the war in Afghanistan alone — and over $ 8 trillion total for the post-9 / 11 wars in other places as well .” “ It ’ s shocking ,” she said , “ that the U . S . government hasn ’ t had a serious reckoning with the U . S . militarized counterterrorism model and its human and financial costs over the past two decades .”
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