Recommendation • A TFR and positive control of all air operations must be established at the outset of a disaster response. The Air Operations branch must be divided into both manned and unmanned groups. De-confliction of airspace can be accomplished by separations that include vertical distance, horizontal distance, or by timing of entering and exiting aircraft. All aircraft must be able to communicate with both ground-based air and air-to-air operations.
• Air Operations must be assigned at outset of response.
• All air assets must communicate with Incident Command’s Air Operations; there can be no rogue units.
Communications Between Air Assets, Incident Command and Volunteer Search Teams
The Wimberley flood response presented an extraordinary set of difficulties with two distinct bases of operations. While Incident Command was in charge of all authorized responders (sworn and unsworn), including TEXSAR and TXTF1, a volunteer civilian search effort was driven by a non-local, influential family who was unfamiliar with emergency operations or procedures in Hays County. The civilian volunteers were comprised of both air and ground resources. A liaison between the civilian volunteers and Wimberley Valley Incident Command was established but proved ineffective. Communications between the authorized responders and the volunteer effort were sporadic and remained poor throughout the event, despite repeated efforts from the IC.
At one point, volunteer air assets numbered as high as 16 full-scale, manned aircraft which were used for recon, search, and shuttling of personnel. The level of pilot qualifications varied from sport pilots that operate over game ranches to commercial flight instructors. The volunteer aircraft were solely dedicated to the volunteer search effort, and no volunteer aircraft were used by Wimberley Incident Command to perform searches, recon, and or any other task. All authorized air operations were provided either by the Wimberley unmanned Air Unit and/or State resources. As TXTF1 concluded their operations, the temporary flight restriction issued for them was cancelled. While initially attempting to submit an application for a temporary flight restriction, the Wimberley Fire unmanned aviation unit was advised by the Emergency Operations Center in Hays County that an additional TFR would not be required. However, the number of aircraft flying without air control, in a small stretch of the Blanco River, was a concern to FAA staff in Washington, DC who were wary of the potential risk.
The FAA worked through the night and into the next morning to assist and support the Wimberley Fire Department to secure a safe flying environment for all aircraft. While operating in Wimberley, communications—both tactical and operational—were directed through Incident Command then relayed to authorized search personnel. However, in Blanco County the communications were limited, while performing primary searches. Poor cell coverage dictated that direct person-to-person communication between the unmanned aerial unit and ground search teams was required. When communication either by cell or radio was available, aerial search findings were communicated directly to Blanco County Incident Command.
Recommendation • Incident Command must oversee the entire emergency response and if a separate volunteer work group is established, then a liaison between the two must be established immediately.
• Coordination of all resources and communication between the authorized responders and volunteer groups must exist and be documented.
• All air resources (manned and unmanned) must coordinate with Incident Command through the Air Operations branch.