The Student Economist , November 2013 | Page 17

Signalling and Screening A solution to asymmetric information is signalling. Individuals and firms use signalling to reveal information to an uninformed party. There are two main examples of signalling in the economy : advertising and education. Firms use advertisements to provide information about their product or service to the public (e.g.) a new hair product or a new and improved android mobile phone. For a firm to provide an effective signal that works, it will have to cost. Advertisements in a magazine or on TV are an effective way of promoting a product or service as customers will see the product, try it, and if they like it, they may then soon become a regular customer. Sometimes in magazine advertisements, the advertisement itself will include ‘as seen on TV’ written on it which makes the product seem as if it’s of a higher quality as the customer can see that the firm are willing to pay for the cost of advertising their product on television. In education, a graduate will include the university in which they got their degree on their curriculum vitae in order to provide the employer with information about how capable their skills are. The cost of the signal in an educational aspect is the cost of the education itself. The graduate will have paid for the education in the university in order to use it on their curriculum vitae as a signal to the employer. Screening is when an uninformed party takes actions in order to reveal hidden information from an informed party. For example, a person buying a horse may not know if the horse has an underlying problem or dormant injury and would therefore request that the horse be checked over by a vet. If the owner of the horse refuses this request, this would raise suspicions to the buyer that the horse has an underlying medical condition. A more subtle example of screening would be when a firm selling car insurance offers two different kinds of policies; one offering a high premium and covering the full cost of any accidents, the second offering a low premium but having a €1500 excess. This means the driver would have to cover the cost of the first €1500 of the damage and the insurance company would cover the rest. This would then reveal the more reckless drivers from the safer drivers as the reckless drivers would not like the thought of paying €1500 every time they have an accident on the roads, so they would then choose the high premium policy.