The Student Economist , November 2013 | Page 15

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Today’s Economy Adverse selection is a problem in today’s economy that arises due to moral hazard. Moral hazard is when one person known as the agent (e.g.) an employee, tends to slack off or make less of an effort in the job required of them, and when another person called the principal (e.g.) an employer, cannot monitor them correctly. Moral hazard is extremely evident in the job circuit today. Salary.com released a Wasting Time Survey in 2013 asking employees in a wide range of different occupations and different age groups how they spend their working day. The results came back stating that on average, 34% of employees spend 30 minutes or less each day in an 8.5 hour shift wasting time or doing nothing, 24% spend between 30-60 minutes and 11% spend several hours wasting time in their work day. During this time they either chat to colleagues or use the internet for topics that are not workrelated. Moral hazards do not necessarily have to take place in an office situation. There have been reported examples of babysitters being caught neglecting a child on hidden ‘nanny’ cameras, a step taken by the parents of the child to try and prevent moral hazard from occurring. Moral hazard can also take place outside the workplace. For example, individuals who have insurance cover may behave more carelessly than they usually would as a result of having that insurance cover (e.g.) a person with health insurance may not look after their health as well as an individual without health insurance. Moral hazard can cause adverse selection which is when one person is better informed than another in a situation, and certain firms or companies end up with a bad outcome as a result of this. An example of this would be in car insurance. The insurer has no idea whether the driver of the car is a safe or reckless driver. The driver, wanting to get insured, would most likely not be honest with the insurance company about their driving and this may then cause them to insure a reckless driver. The market for cars is a prominent example of adverse selection. The seller of a vehicle will know more about the vehicles faults or problems than the buyer and may choose to hide that information in order to make a sale on their vehicle. If a consumer buys a car with a &?&?V??F?B6"?2F?V????v?2( ??V???( ????vF?2?6??7V?W'0?&R?v?26WF??W2v?V?'W???r?FV?2F?B&R??B'&?B??Wr2&W7V?B?bF??0?v?V???r&?&?V??F??2F?V??VG2F?&?6W2G&???rG&?F?6????6V6??B??B6?W0?WfV??bF?R?FV??2???6?W?R?bvVV?2??B2F?R'W?W'2v???F????F?R6V??W'0????r6??WF???r&?WBF?R?FV?F?BF?W?F???B?&VfW&V?6R?&??v?WfV???#2?*6?'??6????GG???wwr?6?'??6???#2?v7F??r?F??R?B?v?&??7W'fW???6?FR?"??#??#0??