to our own ends a system ) based on incentivizing actors through distribution of tokens or coins . A diverse and unrelated support group of developers must be brought together and motivated . A proof of stake model of public blockchain development is therefore mooted by which a set of validators take turns proposing and voting on the next block , and the weight of each validator ’ s vote depends on the size of its deposit ( i . e . stake ). Suggested methodology here is that receipt of compensatory stake is a product of work done and validated , and that validation is a result of a random selection of 25 % of available validators and an affirmation of proposed block by 51 % of them . Note that speed of consensus in the decision making process is not as key here as in purely transactional blockchains but it can be speeded up by basic probability algorithms , e . g . Las Vegas , where laws of likelihood can apply . It would also be of benefit that selected validators for a previous block are disqualified from participating in the next round of block validation .
The greatest risk in these systems is that validators are of a limited class and as such are at risk of coordinating their activities . However , as the users in a natural justice blockchain are potentially a very big number , i . e . the number of humanity itself , a development and validation process that includes the users can ensure that a ‘ swing vote ’ by users reduces a monopoly of ‘ validator power ’ emerging . Development in this direction is urged .
The issuance of a native token , Natural Justice coin (‘ JUST coins ’) will be for the incentivization and benefit of developers and validators of the development . But as a utility coin they will also be issued to : participants / users , those that provide computing power , those that gather and submit evidence , those that validate that evidence , those that theorize what the evidence may mean , those that decide upon that evidence ’ s probity and weight on the query in hand , those that develop enforcement methods through crowdfunding and marketing of crowdfunding , by petitioning , by communicating tribunal updates and outcomes .
I propose that the coin be tradeable , so as to enable the greatest incentivization . It will also provide discounts where relevant activities , goods , services arise which the community deems as having a monetary value . The number of coins granted to participants could be , inter alia , a product of the number of validations received as well successful points , decisions made .
Certain rules to ensure fairplay will need to be discovered and agreed such as those participants that develop the blockchain can not vote on its processes but may gain further by participating in crowdfunding and marketing of crowdfunding , etc .
Honesty is to be encouraged as not all evidence submitted by participants will be corroborative and some evidence may be accepted whilst others rejected . Only that evidence which is successful , fit the truth pattern algorithms and those decisions that may have majority support will receive JUST coins . Ideally , encryption will prevent hacking of the identities of participants , evidence providers , advocates and jurors . Professional participants will be encouraged .
Decentralization of evidence gathering and opensource of material gathered is key . This requires a multi-layer secure data management system and selective peer review of sensitive material . The greatest danger is that a system with one administrator may well defeat our purpose , hence the need for immutable and large scale validation . This will require the ability to close down nodes and correction or temporary holding in abeyance of unbalanced or inconclusive nodes without disturbing the overall health of the evidence gathering ‘ chains .’ Evidence , where applicable , will be supported by affidavits of truth .
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