of struggle . But that optimism overlooked the tenacity of the international capitalist system . From 1991 to 1996 the battle for the ANC ’ s soul got underway , and was eventually lost to corporate power : we were entrapped by the neoliberal economy — or , as some today cry out , we “ sold our people down the river ”.
What I call our Faustian moment came when we took an IMF loan on the eve of our first democratic election . That loan , with strings attached that precluded a radical economic agenda , was considered a necessary evil , as were concessions to keep negotiations on track and take delivery of the promised land for our people . Doubt had come to reign supreme : we believed , wrongly , there was no other option ; that we had to be cautious , since by 1991 our once powerful ally , the Soviet Union , bankrupted by the arms race , had collapsed . Inexcusably , we had lost faith in the ability of our own revolutionary masses to overcome all obstacles . Whatever the threats to isolate a radicalising South Africa , the world could not have done without our vast reserves of minerals . Losing our nerve was not necessary or inevitable . The ANC leadership needed to remain determined , united and free of corruption — and , above all , to hold on to its revolutionary will . This would have given it the hegemony it required not only over the entrenched capitalist class but over emergent elitists , many of whom would seek wealth through black economic empowerment , corrupt practices and selling political influence . The ANC leadership needed to remain true to its commitment of serving the people . Instead , we chickened out .
To break apartheid rule through negotiation , rather than a bloody civil war , seemed then an option too good to be ignored . However , at that time , the balance of power was with the ANC , and conditions were favourable for more radical change at the negotiating table than we ultimately accepted . It is by no means certain that the old order , apart from isolated rightist extremists , had the will or capability to resort to the bloody repression envisaged by Mandela ’ s leadership . If we hadn ’ t lost our nerve , we could have pressed forward without making the concessions we did .
It was a dire error on my part to focus on my own responsibilities and leave the economic issues to the ANC ’ s experts . However , at the time , most of us never quite knew what was happening with the top-level economic discussions . As Sampie Terreblanche has revealed in his critique , Lost in Transformation , by late 1993 big business strategies ( hatched in 1991 at the mining mogul Harry Oppenheimer ’ s Johannesburg residence ) were crystallising in secret late-night discussions at the Development Bank of South Africa . Present were South Africa ’ s mineral and energy leaders , the bosses of US and British companies with a presence in South Africa , and young ANC economists schooled in western economics . They were reporting to Mandela , and were either outwitted or frightened into submission by hints of the dire consequences for South Africa should an ANC government prevail with what were considered ruinous economic policies .
All means to eradicate poverty , which was Mandela ’ s and the ANC ’ s sworn promise to the “ poorest of the poor ”, were lost in the process . Nationalisation of the mines for an upturn in the economy , as envisaged by the Freedom Charter , was abandoned . The ANC accepted responsibility for a vast apartheid-
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