The Sevenoaks School Journal of Philosophy - Volume Two APORIAii_digitalversion - Volume 2 | Page 8

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IS MORALITY RELATIVE ?
He rejects this view and suggests that there is room for moral improvement, due
to the existence of other values that we have, thus “we can resolve the conflict
by giving up one of these values or placing limits on it”. 3 In this instance, I insist
that his response consists of an implied elevation of the shared value of peace.
However, under the conditions of relativism, such values are also relative: we
ought or we ought not to strive towards it, but the fact that one does strive to-
wards a certain morality while rationalising in such a way, implies the existence
of an absolute moral standard that promotes the well-being of the members of
the society. Furthermore, the virtue of desiring ultimate peace can hardly be
firm enough grounds for one to start tolerating female circumcision carried out
by several African tribes that harms thousands of women each year. In this way,
the idea that one ought to tolerate some amoral actions seems counterintuitive
and highly suspicious.
Having dealt with this objection, this essay will now consider another
analysis of societal morals. The initial problem arises when we ask the question
of what group constitutes as a society? What happens if a nation entails differ-
ent cultures; or what if one sees oneself as belonging to several cultures; further-
more, how big does the group have to be in order to constitute as a society? At
this point if we make a statement that “an action is right if and only if it accords
with the moral principles of the society he belongs to”, it seems that we are
merely making a descriptive statement (describing what people do), rather than
a prescriptive statement (what they ought to do). Morality is associated with the
latter types of statements. It then maybe the case that moral relativists misuse
the language of morality. Another problematic implication of moral relativism is
that one on laws. The duty to obey the law is prima facie, i.e. it is done to
achieve the best for the society. Laws are closely entangled with morality that
we behold. Therefore, if moral relativism is true, then legislative systems seem to
exist on the weak grounds of mere societal opinions. Then a question arises,
why should anyone tolerate laws of another country on the basis of them merely
holding them? This seems to be a very suspicious and undesirable outcome on
the subject of laws, because societies strive to achieve firmer compliance with
the legal system to promote the general good. In this way, my analysis highlights
3.
Jesse J. Prinz, ‘Emotional Construction of Morals’, 24 May 2017, personal communication.
APORIA: The Sevenoaks School Journal of Philosophy, Vol. II, Publication date: August 2018.