A Division At War — Part II
Highway 2 . By the middle of December , after heavy fighting , the 32 nd breached the main Japanese defensive line . Through the end of December , the division drove west against light resistance . Though the 32 nd saw heavy action only sporadically on Leyte , the cost was still high : 450 dead and 1,491 wounded . 2 Those losses were not replaced before the move to Luzon . Making matters worse , the losses suffered in the Driniumor River fight on New Guinea only a few months earlier were also still not replaced . The division had suffered similar casualties , in numbers ( 450 dead , 1,500 wounded ), at the Driniumor as it did on Leyte . 3 4,000 men lost , none replaced . Those that remained were tired when departing for Luzon .
In no way am I trying to dismiss the 32 nd Infantry Division ’ s struggles on Leyte . It is just completely overshadowed by what they experienced on Luzon . On Luzon , it came down to four words — the Villa Verde Trail . John Carlisle , in Red Arrow Men : Stories About the 32 nd Division on the Villa Verde Trail , states what the division faced along that trail :
This was a mauling fight against the Jap in his remarkable defensive positions , against the terrain , supply , and climate . In those 119 days , the Red Arrow boys fought 22 miles , sometimes 35 yards at a time , with the Japanese never more than 30 feet away . The division killed 9,000 Japs and took 50 prisoners . It lost 4,226 men , about a third of the division strength . 4
The fight will be addressed in the coming pages . First , was this fight even necessary ? A vigorous strategic debate preceded General Douglas MacArthur ’ s “ Return to the Philippines ” should all resources be devoted to Admiral Chester Nimitz ’ s Central Pacific drive , or to MacArthur ’ s quest to reclaim lost territory , specifically the Philippines . That debate is beyond this article ’ s scope . 5 It did undoubtedly make many wonder why they fought on these islands . Was it for MacArthur ’ s ego ? Move forward to the fight for Luzon itself . Once the decision to retake the vast archipelago was made , Luzon , as the largest island and home to Manila , its largest port and prominent air bases and lodgment areas for a future invasion of Japan , was the obvious main target . The U . S . Sixth Army , under the command of General Walter Krueger , invaded Luzon in January 1945 . By the end of February Manila and all points south were either secure or being secured . The Japanese army on Luzon was still formidable , over 150,000 men , most of them on the northern part of the island . They were formidable in numbers , not capability . They had no air cover , no transport . The American forces around Manila were under no threat from the Japanese — a token defensive or covering force was all that was needed . To make these Japanese forces relevant American units had to attack them , in strong defensive positions the enemy prepared for over three years . Of course , American forces attacked . The Sixth Army noted this in their history of the campaign , stating :
… by making us come into the mountain , after him , he hoped to
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