Allied Amphibious Doctrine , the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944 , and Operation OVERLORD
Introduction
The Allied invasion of Normandy
on 6 June 1944 is rightly considered a touchstone event of the Second World War . The Allies ’ success marked the beginning of the war ’ s final phase in Western Europe as German forces were steadily pushed back from their conquered territory into Germany itself . Without the Normandy operation , it is difficult to see how the Allies could have achieved final victory in the West .
Most accounts of the Normandy invasion deal with the assault troops , seaborne and airborne , but rarely do the means of transporting those troops to the objective receive more than passing mention . Without the amphibious landing craft employed by the Allies on that June morning , there would have been no invasion at all . The story of those landing craft , and their critical contribution to the Allies ’ capability to launch such an operation , is as important as the training and deployment of the troops they carried onto those hostile shores .
The design , manufacture , and deployment of suitable amphibious landing craft capable of transporting men and equipment to the Normandy beaches were critical factors in the planning and execution of the operation . Landing craft availability influenced the size , makeup , organization , operational area , and landing schedule of the invasion force and ultimately proved to be a deciding factor in the final operational plan as well as the overall Allied strategic picture in Europe in 1944 .
Doctrinal Development
The development of the specialized landing craft of the Second
World War dates to the early 1920s and the Washington Naval Conference , which placed limits on the naval power of the United States , Japan , Great Britain , France , and Italy . The treaty prohibited the expansion and development of naval bases and facilities beyond certain well-defined areas , which led to the recognition of the need to take or establish forward bases during wartime . This problem applied in particular to the United States , which anticipated a war with Japan in the Pacific Ocean as the most likely scenario for future conflict . 1
War Plan ORANGE articulated the US strategy for a war in the western Pacific and the Philippines . Given the Japanese mandates in the central Pacific following the First World War , the US Navy foresaw the need to seize bases to stage and project American power where it would be needed . It is important to note that , though War Plan OR- ANGE underwent several evolutions , the Philippines were understood to not be defensible given the restrictions of the Washington Naval Treaty . 2
In order to ensure its ability to execute such a plan , as well as take back any lost territory , the Navy identified the need to develop an amphibious doctrine aimed at successfully landing troops on hostile shores in the face of determined opposition . Though the US , Japan , and Great Britain each had a long history of amphibious operations , the program undertaken by the US Ma-
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