The Saber and Scroll Journal Volume 9, Number 3, Winter 2020 | Page 62

The Saber and Scroll
November 8 found the Juneau attached to Rear Admiral Norman Scott ’ s task force escorting three troop transports . On the 11th , Scott rendezvoused with Rear Admiral Daniel J . Callaghan ’ s task force escorting four more troop transports bound for Guadalcanal . Together , the two groups were combat loaded with six thousand troops from the Army ’ s 182nd Infantry Regiment , the 4th Marine Replacement Battalion , and 1st Marine Air Wing personnel .
The decision to commit all available resources , land , sea , and air , to support the First Marine Division was a promise Admiral William F . Halsey Jr ., newly appointed Commander of the South Pacific Fleet , made to his subordinate officers in mid-October . Reinforcement put an exclamation mark on the Allies ’ willingness to begin the long road to Tokyo from where Major General Archer A . Vandergrift ( USMC ) was standing in his headquarters south of the airfield .
Like the Allies , Imperial Japanese Headquarters concluded that the Solomon Islands , and not Papua , had become the defining action of the Pacific War . Decoded Japanese radio messages revealed plans to reinforce the island garrison with seven thousand fresh troops , initially intended for New Guinea , were already underway . Halsey knew a valuable Tokyo Express , such as this , would be heavily defended by biggunned escorts . The dual tasks of escorting the troopships and interdicting the Japanese force fell on Callaghan and Scott . The carrier USS Enterprise and the battleships USS Washington and
USS South Dakota were in the theater but too far away to help .
Scott was junior to Callaghan by just a few days . Although he led the victorious American fleet at the Battle of Cape Esperance , Callaghan , in his flagship USS San Francisco , assumed overall tactical command . “ Uncle Dan ,” formerly President Roosevelt ’ s Naval Attaché , and most recently chief-ofstaff to Halsey ’ s predecessor , was commanding a wartime task force for the first time . Despite the relative experience of the commanders , Callaghan did not seek , nor did Scott offer , advice on formation or tactics .
Neither task force had operated together before that day , necessitating a comprehensive battle plan , or at the very least a meeting of the captains . Neither of those events occurred , nor does history record the two admirals meeting while in the theater .
Before dawn on the 12th , the combined task forces navigated between San Cristobal and Guadalcanal , through Indispensable Strait and Lengo Channel , the southern entrance to “ Ironbottom Sound .” Arriving at their destination off Lunga Point , the transports dropped anchor and began disembarking troops . The escorts assumed anti-aircraft dispositions and waited for the inevitable air attack , which materialized that afternoon . Warned by Coastwatchers , the transports stopped unloading , weighed anchor , and maneuvered with all their available speed .
The Japanese arrived , as predicted at 1400 hours . Anti-aircraft cruisers Juneau and her sister Atlanta ( Scott ’ s
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