Afghanistan : America ’ s Forever War
Finally , the majority of Afghan nationals , approximately 80 percent , 54 appear different from their Sunni counterparts in that , due to their geographic location , they tend to show distinct Mongolian physical features . In conjunction with the Sunni-Shia rift , the Afghan majority often treats Shia Muslims quite poorly , isolating them socially and politically . Western scholars argue that the Sunni-Shia rift is often overgeneralized as an archaic , religious conflict , rather than a modern conflict in failed or nationalist or geostrategic rivalry . 55 The inability of policymakers to account for modern political relations in lieu of religious differences demonstrates yet another failure to understand the sociocultural situation in Afghanistan , as mandated by FM 3-24 , JP 3-24 , FMI 3-07.22 , and the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide .
If one were to put a “ local face ” on COIN efforts , would that face appear as Pashtun , Tajik , Hazara , Uzbek , Turkmen , Nuristani , Pashai , or Aimaq ? What language should one print the literature aimed at garnering all Afghan public support ? Dari , Pashto , or Turkic ? How would anyone adequately represent the Shia minority that is shunned by the Sunni majority ? The diverse aspects of Afghanistan ’ s multi-ethnic culture have been a long-time enigma for secular Westernized nations . Along with cultural and language barriers , US forces have had to work with partner military , police , and government officials whose values or societal norms greatly differ from those in the United States .
The concept of an elected leader falls within US political norms as well as the COIN strategy of “ providing a framework of political reconciliation , genuine reform , popular mobilization , and governmental capacity-building around which all other programs and activities are organized .” 56 The US has always operated under the assumption that all nations desire democracy . Residents often perceive new regimes brought to power with the assistance of the US as American proxies rather than a fair representation of the nation ’ s peoples . 57 In December 2001 , the UN , the United States , and Iran appointed Hamid Karzai , leader of the Popalzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns , as the administrative head of the post-Taliban interim government . During an emergency meeting of 1,550 delegates , the UN elected Karzai as the leader of the Afghan government . 58 However , Karzai ’ s election was not without issue .
His Pashtun origin granted him the popular vote , but this failed to appease the Tajik , Hazara , Uzbek , Nuristani , Pashai , and Aimaq tribes . Throughout , the Tajiks served as a form of power check due to sheer tribal numbers . 59 Karzai also allegedly tolerated corruption throughout the various levels of government while simultaneously demonstrating an unwillingness to pursue the Taliban and Al-Qaeda . It became a popular joke throughout Afghanistan that Karzai was “ no more than the mayor of Kabul , and even that only until it is dark ,” 55 meaning the Afghan government ruled during the day , and the Taliban ruled at night . Karzai ’ s efforts alone are said to have single-
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