The Saber and Scroll
for Afghanistan reconstruction .” 28 In the years between 2002 and 2020 , the costs of reconstruction projects have swelled to $ 133 billion , 29 much of which was either mismanaged , unaccounted for , or like the rule-of-law programs , counterproductive . 30 By 2015 SIGAR had issued thirty-seven inspection reports on a sampling of forty-five Department of Defense projects with a combined value of $ 1.1 billion . 31 This figure grew to six hundred audits and inspections by 2019 . 32 The reports serve as a means to ensure that tax-funded projects have followed three primary criteria :
1 . Construction met contract requirements and technical specifications
2 . The intended recipients were using the facilities
3 . The facilities are structurally sound , completed on time , and were within budget . 33
Of the forty-five Department of Defense reconstruction projects inspected by SIGAR personnel members in 2015 , only seventeen met contract requirements and / or construction standards . Several of those investigated had structural deficiencies so severe that they posed physical dangers to the occupants . For example , a 2013 inspection of the Bathkhak School in the Kabul province found that the contractor used a wood-trussed roof rather than the contract-mandated concrete slabs . A nearly $ 500,000 dry-fire range at the Afghan Special Police Training Center began to disintegrate within four months of the range ’ s completion . Still , authorities failed to hold the contractor responsible before the expiration of the contractor ’ s construction warranties . This range eventually required demolition . 34 Academic and administrative reports assessed that inadequate government oversight and subpar contractor performances were the most significant contributors to these issues . Officials in the Nangahar province stopped asking about timelines or quality of projects simply out of fear that Afghan laborers would falsely accuse them of seeking bribes . 35 US Ambassador Ryan Crocker reflected in a 2016 interview , “ I always thought KARZI had a point , that you just cannot put those amounts of money into a very fragile state and society , and not have it fuel corruption . You just can ’ t .” 36
Crocker ’ s statement should have come as no surprise , as problems with project management surfaced as early as 2011 during the proposed military draw-downs . Many facilities were not accessible to inspectors because of increased violent or volatile insurgent activities . SIGAR personnel were unable to inspect reconstruction projects personally , and they relied upon an agreement for “ vetted and well-trained Afghan civil society partners ” to conduct the inspections . 37 In 2020 testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs , SIGAR claimed to have completed more than one thousand criminal and civil investigations . 38 These investigations lead to 130 convictions , 39 and saved US taxpayers $ 3 billion ; 40 however , despite these accomplishments , SI- GAR maintains that the Department of Defense is still incapable of managing the $ 4 billion allotted to Afghanistan this fiscal year . 41
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