The Saber and Scroll
Early operations in Afghanistan , four years after the release of the 1997 National Security Strategy , were still based upon the false assumption that the insurgency would mirror those of the 20th century , following the Maoist model of “ Protracted Warfare ,” centralized organization and a hierarchical command structure , with clearly defined goals ; 12 however , it quickly became apparent that the insurgents of the twenty-first century , aided by transnational networks , satellite and internet communications , 13 had abandoned the rigidity of the past and replaced it with complex “ matrices of irregular actors with widely differing goals .” 14
The Taliban adopted strategies of protraction and exhaustion , utilizing ambushes , bombings , or attacks on crucial infrastructure to exhaust opposition , intimidate the local population , or compel security to expend scarce resources . 15 An update of the 2013 Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency in April of 2020 , reiterated the commitment to “ long-term partnering and engagement ,” 16 thus demonstrating that the United States may be no closer to achieving its goals of combatting insurgency in Afghanistan than it was in 2001 . Why has the world ’ s largest superpower failed to withdraw from a continuum of operations in an underdeveloped nation ?
US Soldier Stands in a Temporary Dining Facility . Asadabad , Afghanistan . ( Winter , 2002 ). Author ’ s Personal Collection .
Despite American occupation beginning in 2001 , many guiding documents on counterinsurgency were not released until years later , such as FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations in 2004 , which was then replaced by the FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual in 2006 , 17 the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide of 2009 , 18 the Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency in 2013 ,
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