The Saber and Scroll
was the most decisive single military decision of the war . Grant ’ s vision of the war , a vision wholly supported by President Abraham Lincoln , was to fight the Confederates everywhere until they were overwhelmed by superior Union numbers and resources . This vision won the war . General Joseph Hooker had the same numbers and resources at Chancellorsville a year earlier and squandered them . Brager examines the long line of Union failures from First Bull Run to Chancellorsville . With each battle , Brager examines the failures of the commanders of those battles ( Mc- Clellan in the Peninsula and at Antietam , Pope at Second Manassas , Burnside at Fredericksburg , and Hooker at Chancellorsville ). These failures are well known and nothing original tactically is seen in these chapters . General Grant ’ s superiority is informally established as those Grant is compared to exhibit their many poor decisions . Brager is complimentary of General George Meade , the commander of the Army of the Potomac from Gettysburg until the end of the war .
In addition to demonstrating Grant ’ s path to victory , Brager takes the time throughout his book to dispel common Civil War moments and decisions accepted as fact . On Hooker at Chancellorsville , the traditionally accepted belief is that Hooker floundered when an attack was needed or that the Army of the Potomac commander seemed out of touch at critical junctures . Brager reminds the reader that an artillery shell hit the pillar of a house Hooker was leaning against during the battle , throwing him to the ground with a concussion . Hooker was also given brandy after that , no doubt further weakening his faculties ( 69 ). Hooker ’ s lack of aggression can therefore at least be partially understood . At Gettysburg , Brager refutes the idea that Confederate General Ewell cost Robert E . Lee the battle on Day 1 when Ewell did not take Culp ’ s Hill . “ If practicable ,” the phrase Lee sent to Ewell when deciding if Ewell could take the hill left the decision to the general on the ground . Ewell , with federal troops beginning to entrench , viewed the situation as not practicable . According to Brager , Ewell was only following orders and does not deserve the criticism that it was the fact that Ewell was new to Corps command that stopped him from taking Culp ’ s Hill ( 81 ). Later in the battle , Brager also defends Meade for not attacking Lee right after repulsing Pickett ’ s Charge , as Lee had a strong position and could have likely thwarted any counterattack ( 89 ). The fact that Meade ’ s army was exhausted and battered , according to Brager , never even seems to enter the equation . These points would intrigue any avid reader of the Civil War .
There is little in Grant ’ s Victory : How Ulysses S . Grant Won the Civil War that has not been described and analyzed in hundreds of other books . The US Civil War is one of military history ’ s most overanalyzed topics and while Brager does a good job refuting traditional beliefs such as Hooker at Chancellorsville , there is little original analysis . Grant ’ s decision to head south after his repulse in the Wilderness has been analyzed countless times . Grant ’ s decision ’ s effect on the Army of the Poto-
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