Allied Amphibious Doctrine , the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944 , and Operation OVERLORD
Defence , about the necessity of combined operations , especially those of an amphibious nature .
Thanks to indifference on the part of the British Army and Royal Air Force , who saw themselves fighting sweeping battles on the European Continent , only the Royal Navy had any enthusiasm for amphibious operations . Without the support of the other two services , the development of amphibious capability beyond what already existed received low priority . Maund began the study and design of dedicated specialized landing craft based on his observations of Japanese operations in China as well as examining the principles of beach defense and overcoming such defenses . Only with the rise of Winston Churchill in 1940 would the supporters of combined amphibious operations finally receive the attention they merited . 7
Developing the Tools
After the ignominious evacuation from Dunkirk in May
1940 , the British Army realized that , in order to defeat the Germans , they would have to develop the capability to land a sizeable force on the Continent against determined opposition . To this end , Maund ’ s program to develop specialized craft such as the Landing Craft Assault ( LCA ) and the Landing Craft Mechanized ( LCM ) received more funding and resources . The LCA and LCM were small craft designed respectively to carry infantry and vehicles onto a hostile beach .
Upon becoming Prime Minister in May 1940 , Churchill , long an advocate of amphibious capability , ordered the development of larger craft capable of landing troops and equipment directly onto a beachhead without the need to capture a port . The result was the Landing Craft Tank ( LCT ) and the ocean-going Landing Ship Tank ( LST ), a ubiquitous design that saw service into the Twenty-First Century . 8
In the United States , the Marine Corps had developed the doctrine , but still lacked suitable craft with which to implement it . The US Navy Bureau of Ships had submitted several designs , but none had proven satisfactory . To make matters worse , the Bureau of Ships jealously guarded its prerogative regarding ship and boat design , hampering the contributions of private enterprises . 9
The performance criteria for such craft were specific and demanding . First , they had to be seaworthy . Operating against hostile beaches did not guarantee the protection of a breakwater during the approach , so the craft must be capable of reliable handling in rough seas . Second , they had to combine shallow draft with heavy lift capacity . Third , they should be able to efficiently disembark troops , equipment , or cargo directly onto the beach . This last meant that the craft must be able to drive themselves onto the beach itself while still maintaining the capability to retract after unloading . Finally , the craft had to be rugged enough to handle heavy surf , debris-strewn water , and possible enemy fire and remain operational . 10
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