Forging the Vision : Nathanael Green
and Turtle Bay .” Britain maintained control of the city for the duration of the war , just as Greene predicted . 27
However , while Greene ’ s foresight and intuition were acute , he was not always correct . Only a few months later , in November 1776 , he was responsible for the fall of Fort Washington , which proved to be the most significant loss of the American Revolution until the fall of Charleston . While initially instructing Greene “ to defend the post to the last Extremity ,” Washington later modified this order , giving Greene full authority to act as the situation dictated . Greene , although encouraged by Washington to evacuate the fort , decided to reinforce it . When the British attacked , the fort and its three thousand troops , along with arms and supplies , were captured in a mere five hours . The subsequent loss of Fort Lee , also under Greene ’ s charge , left him feeling “ mad , vext , sick , and sorry ,” but the lessons he learned were a valuable part of his maturing process . 28
Greene ’ s experiences in combat led him to the conclusion that direct combat with Britain was a failing strategy . Therefore , he gravitated towards the Fabian strategy of the Roman Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus , one that maximized the army ’ s strengths while compensating for its limitations . Washington , on the other hand , tended to ebb and flow between a conservative Fabian and aggressive Hannibalic strategy , but ultimately Washington envisioned a Hannibalic victory that would give the British a final crushing blow . Greene found this approach impractical and unfeasible as the Continentals stood at nearly every disadvantage . Although subservient to Washington , it is well documented that Greene had Washington ’ s ear above the other generals . The marriage of these contrasting strategies was arguably one of the most significant relationships of the war . 29
Greene understood that traditional ideas would be difficult to overcome . He keenly observed the civilian pressure on Washington to take on the British head-to-head . Greene believed this was an impractical , if not reckless , strategy . In 1777 , Greene wrote to Washington , expressing the concerns of his observations , stating that he has seen the “ difficulty of [ Washington ] ... to satisfy the Expectations of an ignorant Populace , with great Concern .” However , Greene felt he understood what the army needed to do to be successful , and had no qualms about relaying these ideas to Washington . 30
Greene told Washington that he believed Washington had two strategic options : to fight “ upon the common Principles of War ” without “ the least Prospect of Success ” or to “ remain inactive , & be subject to the Censure of an ignorant & impatient populace .” Greene suggested that if he went with the former , it would make a bad situation worse , and when it failed he would forever “ stand condemned .” However , if he opted for the latter , he could rely on his own judgment , giving himself the necessary time to overcome the army ’ s deficiencies , and in doing so , would prevail and be revered by “ all future Generations .” 31
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