Afghanistan : America ’ s Forever War
an updated FM 3-24 in 2014 , and an updated Joint Publication 3-24 in 2020 . Each publication expanded on its predecessor , yet failed to yield the changes needed to end the conflict .
Significant audits of COIN efforts did not occur until the US was eleven years into the conflict . COIN is defined as “ the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes simultaneously .” 19 In 2013 , the RAND Corporation published an analysis of the performance of twenty-four COIN concepts addressed in the aforementioned publications . The concepts analyzed by RAND were those of legitimacy in government , cultural awareness putting a “ local face on it ,” and implementation of democracy , 20 in addition to the concepts of civil security , civil control , essential services , governance , and economic and infrastructure development , as provided by the US Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual . 21
The citizens of a country will pursue the “ best deal ,” in terms of services , whether government officials or insurgent organizations provide them . 22 It is for this reason that military advisors decided in April of 2002 that the best way to separate the Taliban and its support base was to rebuild the economy and infrastructure of Afghanistan . 23 Within six years after the United States ’ initial announcement of Afghan reconstruction plans , the US completed approximately $ 7 billion worth of projects . These include the completion of 1,056 miles of paved and 685 miles of gravel roads , reconstruction of approximately
445 miles of the Herat Highway , construction or refurbishment of 670 clinics or health facilities , the distribution of $ 6 million worth of pharmaceuticals , the training of 10,600 health workers and 65,000 teachers , the repair or construction of 670 schools , the printing of sixty million Dari and Pashto textbooks , irrigation systems for 1,220,700 acres of land , and vaccinations for and veterinary medical treatment of twentyeight million livestock . 24
The scale of these projects and those that would come in the future , necessitated independent and objective audits to identify and eliminate fraud , waste , and abuse . Coincidentally , the 2006 FM 3-24 had mandated that “ Commanders should identify contractors operating in their AO and determine the nature of their contract , existing accountability mechanisms , and appropriate coordination relationships .” 25 Yet it was not until the release of the updated FM 3-24 in 2014 that criteria expanded to include “ enforcing accountability , building transparency into systems , and emplacing effective checks and balances to guard against corruption are important components to any relief , reconstruction , or development program .” 26 Under the authority of Section 1229 of the National Defense Authorization Act , Congress authorized the creation of the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction ( SIGAR ) in 2008 . 27 SIGAR is currently “ the only inspector general with the interagency authority to audit and investigate the activities of all U . S . government agencies and international organizations that receive U . S . funding
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