Allied Amphibious Doctrine , the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944 , and Operation OVERLORD
percent for LSTs . These new rates only applied to US craft , as the British insisted on retaining the lower COSSAC figures because they were more realistic . As it turned out , the new rates were pessimistic . On D-day , the rates for all American landing craft were above ninety-nine percent , and the British were above ninety-six percent . 46
In February , Eisenhower met with Admiral Charles Cooke of the CNO ’ s War Plans Division and General John Hull , Chief of the US Army ’ s Operational Planning Department to discuss the landing craft situation . Cooke and Hull were able to convince Eisenhower that he possessed more than enough lift for OVERLORD without having to pull extensively from ANVIL .
On 13 February , Eisenhower , Cooke , and Hull proposed reducing the numbers of landing ships and making up for the loss by overloading others . The plan was criticized by the command of 21 st Army Group , the command headquarters for the ground forces , as taking a narrow logistical view toward loading as opposed to a tactical view . Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay , the Allied Naval Commander , Expeditionary Force , echoed this criticism . Ramsay noted in his diary that Eisenhower , Cooke , and Hull were “ forgetting that we have to look tactically to assault a strongly defended coast & any arithmetical calculation is bound to be impractical operationally .” 47 The British Chiefs of Staff rejected the proposal .
The British Chiefs also took the opportunity to reiterate their opposition to ANVIL , which they saw as not only draining resources from OVER- LORD but also Italy . Italian operations retained a high priority with the British , a sentiment echoed by Eisenhower , which put the Supreme Commander in a tight spot .
The difference of opinion revolved around Eisenhower ' s belief that ANVIL was vital to the success of OVERLORD , a view , as noted previously , not shared by the British . Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke , the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff , made a strong case that the needs of Italy and ANVIL would create either a shortage of badly needed divisions in the former or a lack of adequate buildup forces for the latter . Doing both was impossible .
The wrangling continued between Eisenhower and the Combined Chiefs , including some horse-trading of landing craft resources as Mediterranean needs spiked thanks to the difficulties at Anzio . By March , Eisenhower began to realize that the resources in men and materiel did not exist to execute ANVIL simultaneously with OVERLORD while also maintaining the needs of Italy . On 21 March , he recommended the cancellation of ANVIL . With the decision made , OVERLORD was assured of the landing craft needed to execute the operation . 48
Conclusion
The landing craft employed in Operation OVERLORD performed admirably . It is impossible to think of the operation without conjuring images of the assault troops hitting
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