The Saber and Scroll Journal Volume 9, Number 3, Winter 2020 | Page 192

The Saber and Scroll
X , some 4,500 yards west of the Driniumor , was the fallback position . It took the 2nd Battalion , 128th Infantry Regiment three days to reach the river . The 127th Infantry Regiment and 1st Squadron , 112th Cavalry also withdrew . It was necessary , although some disagreed . 33
General Charles Hall commanded the entire front . His superior , General Krueger , believed the withdrawal unnecessary . 34 He believed this despite the defenders being outnumbered ten to one and the Japanese pouring through huge gaps in the line . He ordered Hall to drive the Japanese back and sent him three more battalions to do so , two from the 31st Infantry Division , the other from the 32nd ’ s 127th Infantry Regiment . Before any attack could be launched , units had to consolidate and cut off groups brought back into friendly lines and eliminating scattered pockets of Japanese . By 15 July , only five days after the initial attack , General Hall was already pushing General Gill to get the 32nd Infantry Division and other units moving again :
Careful analysis of your situation discloses at your disposal 127 , 128 ( - ), 124 ( - ), 112th , some tank-destroyers and engineers . Confronting you west of Driniumor is an undetermined number of Japs but certainly not your equal in either numbers or firepower . It appears to me with the forces at your disposal if the proper offensive action is instituted at once you should be able to clear the area west of the Driniumor within 48 hours .
Troop movements have been delayed and I cannot promise you any reinforcement . I don not attempt to tell you what measures to take to counter an offensive from the east and at the same time clean up the situation west of the Driniumor . It cannot be done by defensive action . I expect you to take all offensive measures not only to clarify the situation but to eradicate the enemy west of the Driniumor . You must do it with your own forces which are considered adequate for the purpose . We cannot waste time by dilatory tactics . While I appreciate that some of your troops are tired I know of no battle which was entered into with fresh troops . Please give this your personal attention and push it to a conclusion in order that incoming troops may be used to finish up this situation outside of your area . 35
This message , while worded differently , parallels that which MacArthur gave Eichelberger before dispatching him to Buna . Hall said the Japanese were not Gill ’ s equal in numbers . Wrong . He could not give him any more men or support . The use of the word “ dilatory ” was insulting to all who absorbed that attack and prepared to launch their own . Yet , in New Guinea , such was the life of the 32nd Infantry Division . The situation was never ideal , even this late in the war . By the end of August , all had returned to normal . The line was restored and the Eighteenth Japanese Army was shattered . The entire Amer-
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