Allied Amphibious Doctrine , the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944 , and Operation OVERLORD
Though production began in earnest , it was not without its problems . The US Navy Bureau of Ships continued its obfuscation for another year while small boat manufacturers and major shipyards tooled up to produce the new designs . There was fierce competition for resources , especially steel , wood , and marine engines . With the Battle of the Atlantic still raging and the Navy trying to expand its fleet of escorts as well as carriers and capital ships for the Pacific , the President ' s list of " must-have " programs for 1943 did not include landing craft . 16
There was also a severe shortage of trained operators for the new craft . The Navy and Coast Guard established special training programs but there was a lack of experience even among the cadre . Andrew Higgins stepped in again . At the request of the Navy and Marine Corps , he had established the Higgins Boat Operators and Marine Engine Maintenance School in New Orleans in July 1941 . Higgins Enterprises fully funded the school . 17
By mid-1942 , Higgins had trained over two thousand Navy , Marine , and Coast Guard personnel , but the demand was insatiable . In June , the Amphibian Command of the United States Engineers assumed control of the school to accommodate Army students as well . Even this was not enough , so Higgins helped the Navy establish its own schools throughout the country which were more accessible to the naval bases themselves . Most of the instructors were graduates of the original Higgins school in New Orleans . 18
The Problem of Lift
The first British examination of
a cross-Channel operation conceived a comparatively small undertaking launched in the Pas-de- Calais area in the event of a collapse of German power in the West . Codenamed ROUNDUP , the plan was envisioned as the beginning of the final act in a protracted war aimed at disrupting the orderly withdrawal of German forces as opposed to defeating them in battle . As the British were fighting alone at the time , its scale was commensurate with projected British capabilities . 19
With the entrance of the United States into the war in December 1941 , the form and aim of ROUNDUP began to evolve toward a true offensive operation . 20 When strategic decisions regarding North Africa and the Mediterranean pushed the cross-Channel operation back to 1943 and then 1944 , Allied planners faced a vacuum of official direction . In 1943 the continued planning for ROUNDUP was undertaken by the office of the Chief of Staff , Supreme Allied Command ( COSSAC ). There was some wrangling over the makeup of the planning staff and the command structure , but by March , British Lt . General Sir Frederick Morgan was named Chief of Staff and charged with continuing plans for the operation . 21
Even before Morgan ’ s appointment and the handover of the planning responsibilities to COSSAC , Allied planners under the auspices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff had begun to review the previous two years ' worth
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