The Saber and Scroll Journal Volume 5, Issue 4, Fall 2016 | Page 7

Fleet-in-Being: Tirpitz and the Battle for the Arctic Convoys
Tormod B. Engvig
The history of the German battle fleet in World War II is largely one of
struggle against hopeless odds, punctuated by brief but dramatic clashes as far
afield as the South Atlantic and high Arctic. Yet despite its modest size in relation
to its main adversary, the Royal Navy, the German battle fleet occupied a central,
almost mythical place in the minds of British planners, who for much of the war
saw the individual capital ships of the Kriegsmarine as potent threats to their
maritime dominance. The most important role Adolf Hitler’s capital ships
performed was as a “fleet-in-being,” where by their presence astride the Allies’
vital seaborne trade routes they represented a significant threat.
Of all the Kriegsmarine’s capital ships, none had a more palpable effect
on British maritime strategy than the battleship Tirpitz. As the second and last unit
of the Bismarck class, she was arguably the most powerful warship built in Europe
before or since. However, her wartime career as her own fleet-in-being was neither
very eventful nor very glamorous—especially when compared to the epic drama of
the Bismarck, her famous sister, which has been immortalized in numerous books
and a feature-length film. However, Tirpitz was—if more subtly so—by far the
more effective ship, although she never fired her guns in anger at an Allied
counterpart. 1
Tirpitz, her mundane life notwithstanding, not only contributed indirectly
to major Allied shipping losses, but the threat she posed while lurking in Norway’s
fjords tied down significant Allied naval forces in northern Europe. This was at a
time when Allied warships were hard pressed in other theatres. She also forced the
British, who became obsessed with her destruction, to commit resources out of all
proportion to her value in repeated attempts to sink her. These operations were
costly both in terms of men and materiel and achieved little lasting success until
1943–1944. By then, the Allies had for all intents and purposes won the naval
conflict in Europe, and Tirpitz had ceased to be a significant player in the war.
As the Chief of the Italian General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, once
remarked, “The conception of a naval battle as an end in itself is absurd.” 2 Echoing
similar sentiments, Britain’s First Sea Lord, Admiral Dudley Pound, asserted in
1942 that “It is only the politicians who imagine that ships are not earning their
keep unless they are madly rushing about the ocean.” 3 While perhaps
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