The Saber and Scroll Journal Volume 5, Issue 4, Fall 2016 | Page 19

in their proper context. 36
The mere presence of Tirpitz as a fleet-in-being in Norway tied down
considerable enemy resources. These would have been of great value to the hard
pressed Allies on other fronts, especially in 1942. The British regularly called upon
the Home Fleet, based at Scapa Flow in northern Scotland, to provide long distance
protection for the Arctic convoys in case the beast should come out of her lair.
British and American heavy warships remained off Norway while the naval war
teetered on disaster in other theatres. The Home Fleet’s assets would without a
doubt have proven useful in either the Mediterranean or South Pacific, where the
Royal Navy was fighting for its life bringing convoys to Malta, while at the same
time trying to check the Japanese rampage in South East Asia and the Indian
Ocean. Additionally, the allocation of destroyers to screen the Home Fleet for its
sorties against Tirpitz also meant that these small warships were unavailable to
escort convoys and to help counter the U-boat menace in the Atlantic, which
reached its last, great crisis point in 1942. 37
British efforts to neutralize Tirpitz comprised a multitude of schemes,
some more imaginative than others. The most common attacks mounted on the
battleship while in Germany as well as in Norway consisted of Royal Air Force
Bomber Command raids and Royal Navy carrier airstrikes. By and large these raids
achieved little success until 1944, by which time Tirpitz had ceased to play any
practical role in the war. Had the British air raids met with success in 1942 the
effort would doubtlessly have been worth it. However, by the time the air raids
finally succeeded, the real reason for mounting them—neutralizing Tirpitz to keep
the sea lanes safe–no longer existed.
Though costly, the September 1943 “X-craft” midget submarine attack on
Tirpitz—which left her crippled for six months—effectively ended the threat of the
German battleship to the Arctic convoys, which resumed their runs to the Soviet
Union that November. Though the Germans brought the ship back to operational
readiness the following spring, there was no conceivable way for her to directly
affect the naval war from then on. Had she dared to go to sea in 1944 there is little
reason to believe her fate would have been any different than that which befell
Scharnhorst off the North Cape. 38
The story of Axis battleships—German, Italian, and Japanese—in World
War II presents a sobering picture. Unlike their Allied counterparts, the Axis
vessels never really found a purpose for which they were well suited. German
capital ship raiding doctrine, pioneered by Grand-Admiral Raeder, proved a flawed
concept and a strategic dead-end. In addition, the Axis navies rarely conducted
shore bombardment and support of amphibious landings. Lastly, in the few classic
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