The Saber and Scroll Journal Volume 5, Issue 4, Fall 2016 | Page 15

Barents Sea, where interference from Tovey’s covering force was less likely. Any
attack on the convoy west of this meridian was to be conducted by U-boats and
aircraft only. 22
From the beginning, several factors severely limited the German surface
fleet’s freedom of movement. Hitler insisted that first the Germans attack and
neutralize any enemy carrier detected in the area. This dramatically curtailed
Admiral Schniewind’s freedom of action. The second was the expert navigation
required along Norway’s shoal-strewn coast; the operation got off to an
inauspicious start when Lützow ran aground in thick fog, as did three of the four
destroyers that sailed with the Tirpitz group. Lastly, a shortage of fuel oil limited
the German fleet’s speed and operational radius. 23
The German surface force, minus the four grounded ships, finally sortied
with Hitler’s blessing from Altafjord against PQ-17 on 5 July 1942, two days after
assembling. However, by then the force had already accomplished more than it
could reasonably have hoped for, as before the Germans sortied—and to their
stunned disbelief—PQ-17 scattered. Responsibility for this momentous decision
lay at the feet of Britain’s First Sea Lord, the ailing Admiral Dudley Pound. It had
been brought about by the belief that Tirpitz and her consorts had already sailed
and were bearing down on the convoy. The order to scatter was essentially an act of
desperation; the logic was that individual ships, running for their lives, would have
a statistically higher chance of reaching port. 24
As it was, not only were the German warships still swaying placidly at
anchor in Altafjord when Admiral Pound made his tragic judgment, but the
German surface fleet never got anywhere near the convoy. After rounding the
North Cape and steaming east to his operational area, Schniewind began to receive
updates of the convoy’s dispersal and the U-boat and bomber attacks being
conducted against it. As Tirpitz was primarily there to neutralize the convoy escorts
so the smaller vessels could engage the merchantmen, Grand-Admiral Raeder no
longer saw any need to risk his prestige warship with the enemy convoy scattered
and at the mercy of the U-boats and Luftwaffe. The disappointment was palpable
onboard the German ships as the order was given. The force put about that same
evening and reached Narvik without incident the next day, 6 July. 25
The order to scatter in the constricted waters of the Barents Sea left the
hapless merchantmen to the mercy of the Germans. Of the convoy’s original 33
vessels, the Germans sunk 24, including 22 precious merchantmen with their even
more precious cargo. With them went 153 unfortunate souls, 430 tanks, 210
aircraft, 3,350 motor vehicles of various types, and almost 100,000 tons of general
cargo, including electronics and ammunition. As noted, the German ships returned
15