The Saber and Scroll Journal Volume 1, Issue 1, April 2015 | Page 10

state of Washington’s army was such that he had to avoid a decisive battle with the
British as it would favor the British Army overwhelmingly.
This left an army under the command of General Horatio Gates to defend
the northern area against General Burgoyne’s southward driving British force.
Everyone on both sides expected Howe to drive north along the Hudson River to
link up with Burgoyne’s army which would effectively cut New England off from
the rest of the colonies. Instead, Howe led his army out in an attempt to force a
decisive battle with Washington’s Continentals and took Philadelphia, the rebel
capital. Burgoyne’s force was left on its own to smash Gates’ army.
General John Burgoyne, commander of the British force coming south
from Canada, was an aggressive officer. At the same time, he was the typical
product of the British officer corps. He liked his luxuries even on campaign. To
this end, he brought his mistress and thirty carts of personal goods on the
campaign despite the desperate need of the wagons to haul military supplies his
army needed. 2 Burgoyne was a legendary gambler as well. His campaign would be
no different. He made his plans with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord
George Germain, a man the British Army had cashiered in 1759 and who had won
his post through political means. 3 Between these two men, they planned a
campaign that failed to take into account many factors which most British
commanders would continue to ignore throughout the entire war.
Burgoyne’s first mistake was his failure to understand the terrain and the
challenges it would present to his campaign. The sheer size of the colonies
repeatedly frustrated the British in the war as military planners in London failed to
comprehend the distances involved. Mistaken assumptions about the campaign
distance left Burgoyne with a supply chain stretched out over miles; he was simply
unable to defend it. The second flaw was overestimating the number of British
Loyalists, or Tories, that would join and support Burgoyne’s invasion force.
During the war, Lord Germain continually imagined Loyalists everywhere in the
colonies, but they often failed to materialize. 4 The third flaw in the campaign was
in splitting Burgoyne’s forces into two separate commands and expecting them to
accomplish their objectives, and then to link up on the Hudson River.
This second force, led by Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger, was too
small and depended too heavily upon expected Tories and Mohawk Indians to
achieve its goals. While Burgoyne went south along the Lake Champlain route, St.
Leger was supposed to sail across Lake Ontario and then strike east, take the
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