June 2026
CHIEF ENTITLED TO DEFENSE: WHY NJSA 40A: 14-155 SUPPORTS SEPARATE COUNSEL FOR CHIEFS PERSONALLY NAMED IN CIVIL LITIGATION
Chief Louis J. Bordi( Ret.) & Chief Raymond Hayducka, NJSACOP Professional Services Division
of the department under the statute and |
therefore |
entitled |
to |
the |
same |
protections |
afforded |
to |
other |
law |
enforcement personnel. |
New Jersey courts have repeatedly recognized the broad remedial purpose of the statute. In Moya v. City of New Brunswick, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that the statute is designed to protect officers from the financial burden of defending actions arising from the performance of official police duties. The Court noted that the Legislature intended to provide expansive protection to officers acting within the scope of their responsibilities.
Civil litigation against law enforcement agencies has become increasingly common in modern policing. In many of these lawsuits, plaintiffs do not merely sue the municipality or police department; they also name the Chief of Police individually and personally as a primary defendant. When that occurs, an important legal and operational question arises: Is the Chief entitled to independent legal counsel separate from the municipality’ s attorney?
Under New Jersey law, the answer is often yes.
The foundation for that protection is found in N. J. S. A. 40A: 14-155, commonly referred to as the“ Chief entitled to defense” statute within law enforcement circles. While many officers and municipal officials generally understand that municipalities must defend police officers acting within the scope of their duties, there is often confusion regarding how the statute applies to a Chief of Police who is personally named in litigation alongside the municipality itself.
A careful reading of the statute, combined with established legal principles surrounding conflicts of interest and municipal representation, demonstrates why separate counsel is not only appropriate in many cases, but legally necessary.
Similarly, in Valerius v. City of Newark, |
the Appellate Division reinforced that |
municipalities bear the obligation to |
defend officers when litigation arises |
directly from |
police functions |
and |
official conduct. |
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The legislative purpose behind the statute is equally important. Law enforcement officers must make difficult operational decisions daily, often under significant pressure and with substantial public scrutiny. The statute recognizes that officers, including chiefs, should not be forced to personally finance legal defenses for actions taken within the lawful performance of official responsibilities.
For chiefs specifically, the exposure can be even greater.
Understanding the Statute
N. J. S. A. 40A: 14-155 provides that whenever a member or officer of a municipal police department is a defendant in any action or legal proceeding arising out of and directly related to the lawful exercise of police powers in the furtherance of official duties, the municipality shall provide for the defense of that officer or member.
The language is broad and intentionally protective. Importantly, the statute does not exclude chiefs of police. A Chief of Police is unquestionably an“ officer” or“ member”
Unlike line officers who may be named due to direct conduct during an incident, chiefs are frequently sued under theories of supervisory liability, policy failures, training deficiencies, negligent retention, or alleged constitutional violations tied to department administration.
New Jersey Police Chief Magazine / 8