The NJ Police Chief Magazine - Volume 31, Number 9 | Page 17

The New Jersey Police Chief Magazine | May 2025
Continued from previous page Defendant’ s possessory or ownership interest in the suitcase ceased when he fled police outside Penn Station and deliberately left his suitcase behind in a public place with no evidence of anyone else’ s interest in the bag. Because the State has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the suitcase was abandoned, defendant is without standing to challenge its seizure and search.
Police could not follow suspected drunk driver into garage State v Mellody 479 N. J. Super. 90( App Div 2024) The court reverses defendant ' s driving while intoxicated( DWI) conviction because it was based on evidence obtained by a police officer following his unlawful entry into defendant ' s garage. The court remands for the Law Division judge to determine whether defendant ' s careless driving conviction can be sustained based on information learned before the officer unlawfully crossed the threshold of defendant ' s home.
The court addresses the circumstances in which a police officer may enter a suspect ' s residence in connection with a drunk or careless driving investigation. The court holds that while police have the authority to perform various " community caretaking " functions— such as determining whether a suspected drunk driver needs medical attention— they may not make a warrantless entry into a suspect ' s home to execute an investigative detention without consent or exigent circumstances. The court holds this rule applies to defendant ' s garage.
The court also holds this was not a fleeting or de minimus entry. The officer entered the garage to execute an investigative detention, that is, to seize defendant. The court stresses that even the brief entry of the home to effectuate the seizure of a resident is a significant constitutional intrusion. The court ultimately concludes the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the officer lawfully entered the garage to render emergency aid under the exigent circumstances exception.
Disorderly person defendants not excluded from Recovery / Drug court State v Matrongolo 479 N. J. Super. 8( App. Div 2024)
In this appeal, the court held individuals convicted of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense are not categorically excluded from Recovery Court under Track Two based on the classification of their conviction. The court first found the matter justiciable despite the defendant ' s death and then rejected the rationale that Recovery Court is available only to those convicted of a " crime," which disorderly persons and petty disorderly persons offenses are not under our Criminal Code.
Lane change vio here did not permit drug dog sniff State v Boone 479 N. J. Super. 193( App. Div. 2024)
The court reversed the denial of a motion to suppress drug evidence discovered by a detective following a dog sniff after an admitted pretext stop. Although not questioning the detective ' s good faith or impugning the trial court ' s finding that he was a credible witness, the court finds neither is enough to justify this stop. " The suspicion necessary to justify a stop must not only be reasonable, but also particularized." State v. Scriven, 226 N. J. 20, 37( 2016). The detective failed to offer facts sufficient, as a matter of law, to allow the court to determine he possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion that Boone failed to maintain his lane " as nearly as practicable." N. J. S. A. 39:88( b). See State v. Woodruff, 403 N. J. Super. 620, 627-28( Law Div. 2008).
The appeals court did not reach defendant ' s argument that the automobile exception did not apply because the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were not spontaneous and unforeseeable as required under State v. Witt, 223 N. J. 409, 447-48( 2015). See State v. Smart, 253 N. J. 156, 171( 2023).
Defendant with consecutive driver ' s license suspensions for various offenses, including DWI, violated criminal DWS 2C: 40-26( b State v Italiano 480 N. J. Super. 1
The court was asked to consider whether a defendant, serving sequentially several consecutive periods of driver ' s license suspensions imposed for various convictions including driving while under the influence( DWI) offenses, can be charged with violating N. J. S. A. 2C: 40-26( b) for driving during the suspension period for a non-DWI-related offense while awaiting commencement of a court-imposed DWI license suspension. The court determined because the effective date of defendant ' s most recent DWIrelated conviction was delayed only due to other consecutively imposed accumulated sentences, defendant violated N. J. S. A. 2C: 40-26( b) when he operated his vehicle prior to the conclusion of the suspension for his DWI offense.
The court distinguished State v. Perry, 439 N. J. Super. 514( App. Div. 2015). It noted the Perry court determined N. J. S. A. 2C: 40-26( b) " punishes those who drive while suspended for violations of the DWI... law... when they drive during the courtimposed period of suspension," and it was not intended to criminalize " driving during a period of administrative suspension " when driving privileges could have been restored but for the defendant ' s failure to complete the process for administrative restoration. Id. at 531-32.
The court observed defendant was not driving during a period of administrative suspension after having completed his courtordered suspension. Rather, he had not yet completed his suspension term for the most recent of his four DWIs. The court concluded it would be illogical for defendant to avoid a conviction for violating N. J. S. A. 2C: 40-26( b), in light of defendant ' s four prior DWIs, merely because the suspension for his latest DWI had not yet commenced because he incurred multiple other intervening license suspensions.
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