The New Jersey Police Chief Magazine | April 2024
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exception to the warrant requirement does not justify the officer ’ s search of the black bag or his seizure of the weapons in that bag , and the denial of defendant ’ s motion to suppress constituted error .
Defendant was indicted , and he moved to suppress the weapons found in the black bag in the storage trailer . The trial court denied defendant ’ s motion , concluding that N . D . had consented to the search of the storage trailer and the seizure of the weapons found in the black bag in that trailer , and that the black bag containing the weapons was in plain view . The Appellate Division affirmed . The Court granted defendant ’ s petition for certification . 251 N . J . 502 ( 2022 ).
HELD : N . D . had apparent authority to consent to the officer ’ s search of the storage trailer . However , the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not justify the officer ’ s search of the black bag or his seizure of the weapons in that bag , and the denial of defendant ’ s motion to suppress constituted error .
1 . The State bears the burden to prove that a warrantless search was constitutional because it falls within an exception to the warrant requirement . Here , the State invokes the doctrine of apparent authority to consent as the basis for Roxby ’ s search of the storage trailer and the exigent-circumstances exception to justify the search of the black bag and the seizure of the weapons .
2 . In certain settings , a person other than the defendant may validly consent to the search of the defendant ’ s home or property . A third party ’ s authority to consent rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control . An officer may , depending on the circumstances , rely on the apparent authority of a person consenting to a search . Apparent authority arises when a third party ( 1 ) does not possess actual authority to consent but appears to have such authority and ( 2 ) the law enforcement officer reasonably relies , from an objective perspective , on that appearance of authority in view of the facts and circumstances known at the time of the search .
3 . The Court reviews the information known to Roxby about N . D .’ s nexus to the storage trailer when he entered and searched it , including N . D .’ s affirmations that she also kept belongings in the trailer ; text messages attributed to defendant suggesting defendant considered the residential trailer to be N . D .’ s , that N . D . had lived in that trailer and the community longer than defendant had , and that he planned an imminent move out of her home ; and N . D .’ s access to the storage trailer . Considered in tandem , those factors support an objectively reasonable conclusion that N . D . had authority to consent to a search of the storage trailer .
4 . That N . D . had apparent authority to consent to the search of the storage trailer does not resolve the question whether Roxby ’ s search of the bag found inside that trailer and his seizure of the weapons were constitutional , however . A third party who has common authority over the premises might nevertheless lack common authority over the items therein .
5 . Here , the State relies on the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement . That exception typically applies when there was an objectively reasonable basis to believe that lives might be endangered or evidence destroyed by the delay necessary to secure a warrant . The Court has identified a non-exclusive set of factors to be considered in determining whether exigent circumstances existed at the time of the disputed search . The determination is fact-sensitive and requires the court to assess the totality of the circumstances .
6 . The first factor -- the seriousness of the crime under investigation -- favors the State ’ s position in this case . Roxby was investigating allegations of domestic violence , “ a serious crime against society .” N . J . S . A . 2C : 25-18 . The second factor -- the urgency of the situation faced by the officers -- does not favor the State ’ s position . When Roxby entered the storage trailer , defendant was under arrest and detained at the Police Department for processing pending his transfer to county jail . There was no realistic basis for concern that if Roxby paused to contact a judge and requested a warrant , defendant would be in a position to retrieve his weapons from the storage trailer pending the judge ’ s issuance of that warrant . And if Roxby was called away for an emergency while he waited for a warrant , he could have ensured that the storage trailer was locked during his absence . The third factor -- the time that it would have taken to secure a warrant -- does not favor either party ’ s position because the record includes no evidence of the amount of time that process would have taken . The fourth factor -- the threat that evidence would be destroyed or lost or people would be endangered unless immediate action was taken -- does not support a finding of exigent circumstances given that defendant was under arrest , and there is no evidence in the record that he could have secured the assistance of a third party who had a key to the storage trailer . The fifth factor -- information that the suspect was armed and posed an imminent danger -- similarly weighs against a finding of exigency . The sixth factor -- the strength or weakness of the probable cause relating to the item to be searched or seized -- supports the State ’ s position , given the statements of N . D . and her children .
7 . Weighing those factors , the Court concludes that the State did not prove its claim that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the black bag and the seizure of the weapons . Defendant ’ s motion to suppress the weapons seized through that unlawful search should therefore have been granted . Because those weapons constituted the central evidence against defendant on the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon , defendant ’ s conviction must be vacated . REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court .
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