from another radical idea that is just emerging in U. S.-India bilateral trade, which is why I suggest the blatant gimmick of a“ Trump-Modi Round” to work out the details. As recently as the Trump 1.0 administration, when the U. S. and India sought and failed to negotiate a mini trade deal on tariff and non-tariff barriers, leveraging India’ s benefits under the U. S.“ Generalized System Preferences,” or GSP program, the idea of a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement was a bit looney. Now, however, that is exactly what President Trump and Prime Minister Modi have agreed to do.
In the long history of the GATT and the WTO, the U. S. and India have been the two most consequential players, although predictably as opponents on the key issues facing the organizations. Both were leading contributors to the existing structure, and both are complicit in its slow demise. It seems only natural that the two might be expected to take up the lion’ s share of responsibility to encourage others to accept that the world and global trade have changed, and that the WTO MFN system is no longer compelling as an argument for returning to multilateralism on trade. There is a precedent for naming a trade round after a U. S. president— the Kennedy Round from 1964 to 1967. It was the first round to go beyond negotiations exclusively on tariff cuts to take up non-tariff trade restrictions. Aside from feeding the egos of two of the most prominent world leaders, a Trump-Modi Round would mark the transition to a reality that passed the WTO by in recent years.
What this Trump-Modi Round could do is focus initially on a new architecture for freedom of maneuver on tariffs. Many, although, perhaps, not the U. S., may want to maintain their current MFN tariff levels with most other WTO members. They should be free to do this. But for those that prefer more flexibility to raise or lower tariffs, to essentially rebuild the foundation, all would benefit from new rules that impose some order on the tariff chaos into which world trade has been descending. This could involve negotiations on notifying intent before making tariff changes, allowing for consultation and timetables in transitioning to tariff increases, and even a form of dispute settlement if procedures and transparency requirements were not adhered to. The current WTO provides these kinds of provisions already, but they are structured for an MFN-based system, not one in which unilateral and preferential tariff actions, such as the new( and somewhat halfbaked) U. S.-U. K. deal, might predominate. Who
The Kyndryl Institute Journal 33