pounced upon biological determinism as an ‘anti-Semitic’ ideology of genocide.
VVSpektorowski and Saban see a ‘historical continuity’ between the ‘old eugenics’ and current reproductive and family planning subsidies and immigration policies, implying (actually, more than simply implying) that the distinction between ‘mainline’ and ‘reformist’ eugenics is specious. In other words, eugenics not only has not died away, it has now come out of concealment under the guise of family planning subsidies and selective immigration policies. They distinguish three basic types of ‘welfare regimes’: Liberal (America), Conservative (Germany, France, Israel, the Netherlands), and Social Democratic (Finland). America comes off as ‘liberal’ and Germany-France-Netherlands as ‘conservative’ in that America expects no eugenic quid pro quo in exchange for the welfare dole and has only recently introduced eugenic immigration policies hardly compatible with Emma Lazarus’s words on the Statue of Liberty: "Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.” By contrast, ‘conservative’ states have become far more hard-nosed regarding immigrants and refugees.
VVIf America became an integrationist, ‘inclusionary’ state after the overthrow, in the mid-1960s, of the eugenic legislation originally passed in the 1920s, Europeans and Israelis still cling to ethno-exclusionary visions and perceive themselves as ‘nations’ reluctant to participate in the global melting pot , even as they are compelled by below-replacement birth rates to import foreign labor.
VVOn the political level Spektorowski and Saban maintain that the very idea of protecting a national culture, let alone a national stock, is problematic in democratic societies. And they go on to quote the ex-Zionist Tony Judt, who maintained that nationalism is passé in times of growing migrations.
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