VVSimultaneously happening alongside with the above factors, civilian deaths and cultural misunderstandings still continue to hamper Afghan perceptions of the (ISAF) International Assistance Force and the Afghan government19, 20., 21 As a result of the worsening insurgency, the security of the country has deteriorated even further. This has led to an increasingly difficult environment for political and economic development. This pattern reveals a paradox, where development is vital for security. However, security is also vital to ensure that development can be implemented. More recently this relationship has been in a downward spiral where, as one American soldier stated "The idea in COIN is: Secure, Hold, Build… now we're building, trying to secure, and not holding a lot”14. On top of this, these failures have not been lost on the current Karzai administration which seems to be breaking off ties from its NATO allies and is preparing to accept a system where the insurgency again becomes part of the oligopoly of power within the country for the foreseeable future22.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
VVThis article discussed whether it is possible to have security without development through paralleling a normative vision for the early intervention to the contemporary realities on the ground. It ultimately maintained that it is not possible to have security without development. The article then shifted to discuss how in order to institute security and development in an insurgency situation; states must incorporate aspects of political reform with other factors of socio-economic development, and military securitization. This analysis did this by dissecting the discussion into four separate parts. It first established the conceptualisms for security, development, insurgency, and counter insurgency. Then, it demonstrated how security is fundamentally tied to counter-insurgency strategy. After, it created a normative view by using the existing literature to show how the relationship between the security, development, and counterinsurgency should develop. Finally, it showed how the underlying thesis, of the need for security to have development, was proved through the failures of the British and NATO experiences with counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Moreover, how a failed balance of human security and political-economic development created the distressed mission that is at work today.
8819. Dreyfuss: 2013
8820. Ahmad: 2012
8821. Press TV: 2013
8822. Sukhanyar & Nordland: 2014
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