may not or may, respectively, be morally acceptable. Wolterstorff depends on the majority’s opinion, while Audi leaves room for prayer or meditation if such acts are deemed beneficial - on non-religious grounds - to the children that they would engage.
I.III Time Boundaries for Political Philosophy
VVThe above analysis provides comparisons between multiculturalist and liberal views on state-funded religious schools and on religious observance within public schools, and this paper must also consider briefly the timely nature of multiculturalism and its policies. While Scotland’s multiculturalist education system is no longer as broadly supported as it once was, that does not mean it was never effective or embraced by most of the population. Joseph Raz, in his article defending multiculturalism and multiculturalist policies from what he describes as a liberal perspective and against liberal critiques, begins by clarifying his belief that “we cannot set the precise boundaries for their [political theories’] application.”14 Citing society’s inability to formulaically balance varied and competing moral concerns applicable to all situations of conflict and limitations on predicting the future developments, Raz seeks to limit the eternal quality of previous literature in order to present his own conception of a liberal multiculturalism. Certainly, there is more literature and debate on this notion of the timeliness of political philosophy, but, for this paper’s consideration of the Scottish education system, Raz is relevant because he scrapes the surface of the potential issue of time-boundaries on multiculturalist policies.
II. WHY SCOTLAND?
VVRaz’s conception of the time-bounded nature of political philosophy is particularly relevant to—and particularly well demonstrated by—the case of Scottish multiculturalist education policy. This is true as a result of the broad societal shift in Scotland from sometimes- violent sectarianism in the mold of Northern Ireland to secularism more like in the southern
88814. Joseph Raz, “Multiculturalism, A Liberal Perspective,” 41 Dissent (1994), 67.
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