one dependent variable (the occurrence of balance of power) with another (polarity) (Lebow, 27). To sidestep this potential loophole, therefore, we need to assess the relevance of BOP by examining whether the same structural constraints that engender balancing in the multipolar or bipolar systems are also present in a unipolar world.
VVIf the balance of power could not be directly deduced from system polarity, what then would predict its occurrence? To answer this question is to go back to the two core assumptions and see what explanatory variables can be derived from these assumptions that will have some observable implications with regard to balancing. The likelihood of balance of power is therefore a function of these variables which, as I will show, boil down to 1) intention – notably the intention or the perceived intention of the major powers in the system, 2) preference of the states, particularly that between absolute and relative gains, and 3) contingency, often related to the availability of new information in a given situation, which may exogenously change the first two variables. Most importantly, none of the three is conditional on a certain type of polarity to be effectual.
II. THREE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FOR PREDICTING BALANCING:
INTENTION, PREFERENCE, AND CONTINGENCY
VVThe intention, or the perceived intention of a major power determines whether balancing will be preferred by secondary states over other options such as bandwagoning. We can think of this in terms both of why smaller states sometimes succumb to the sphere of the strongest power in the system, and of why they sometimes stay away from it, or challenge it by joining the second biggest power if there were one. In his analysis of the conditions for cooperation under the security dilemma, Robert Jervis shows that when there are pervasive offensive advantage and indistinguishability between offense and defense (the “worst case” scenario), security dilemma between states can be so acute as to virtually squeeze out the “fluidity” necessary for any balance of power to occur (Jervis 1978, 186-189). By incurring incorrect “inferences”, offensive advantage and offense-defense indistinguishability ultimately serve to alter the perceived intention of the adversary as being aggressive or non-aggressive (Jervis 1978, 201). This will then dictate the smaller states’ decision to or not to balance. If, however, the major power is perceived to have not only a non-aggressive intention, but also a benign intention of providing certain public goods, smaller states may choose to free-ride on these benefits while submitting to the major power’s sphere of influence in return. An outcome of so-called “hegemonic stability” may then ensue (Keohane 1984, 12). Thus along the dimension of perceived intention, balance of power occurs when states have reservations about the major power or the hegemon’s intention but not to the extent that a precipitation to war is so imminent as to render balancing infeasible.
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